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Abstract 
The paper analyses sectoral patterns of intra-Asian trade for selected Asian 
countries as well as for sub-regions within Asia. Beyond a general trend 
towards manufactures, it reveals remarkable differences in specialisation 
profiles between lagging South Asian countries still concentrating on labour-
intensive products while forerunning East and Southeast Asian countries have 
successfully diversified their manufactured exports towards more skill-intensive 
products. Relative to extra-Asian trade, almost all sample countries concentrate 
their intra-Asian exports more on non-manufactures. Within manufactures, 
resource-intensive  goods still play a larger role in intra-Asian trade than in 
trade outside Asia. This reflects both differences in factor endowments inside 
Asia but also differences in access conditions (trade policy). Growth in intra-
Asian trade is attributed not only to overall economic growth but also to large 
declines in transaction costs. The latter  is reflected in lower distance-oriented 
costs, trade liberalisation and, for sub-regions, to convergence in exchange rate 
changes. The paper sees no need for institutionalised regional integration but 
advocates continuing integration into the multilateral trading system 
complemented by some sort of regional co-operation concerning common rules 
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Bibliography                 6 6  I. Introduction* 
By the mid-nineties, about 60 per cent of world trade is accounted for by intra-
regional trade. The share shows a rising trend predominantly due to the 
emergence of intra-Asian trade. Interestingly enough, this trade is not driven by 
effective institutionalised arrangements as the EU internal market. Sub-regional 
Asian preferential schemes such as ASEAN or APEC are either still largely 
redundant in terms of creating or diverting trade or still in the offing. Thus, it is 
the proximity of rapidly growing national markets without discrimination of 
partner countries which seems to have encouraged the exploitation of 
differences in national factor endowments. Still, however, there are notable 
differences in patterns of trade between countries, for instance between South 
Asian countries on the one hand and East and Southeast Asian countries on the 
other hand. 
This paper tries to exhibit such differences in country-specific profiles of intra-
regional trade vs extra-regional trade in more detail. Section II elaborates on 
region-wide results in changes in commodity composition as well as on 
individual countries’ experiences. Section III discusses some possible facets of 
declining transaction costs and income growth as underlying roots of intra-Asian 
growth. Section IV highlights the impact of intra-Asian trade expansion on third 
countries while Section V contributes to a cost-benefit assessment of regional 
integration schemes. Section VI concludes on the findings from this assessment. 
__________________ 2 
*Computational assistance provided by Michaela Rank is strongly appreciated. 
II.  Commodity Composition of Intra-Asian Trade 
1. Region-Wide  Results 
Rapid economic growth drives structural change in production and trade. 
Simultaneously, growth becomes sustainable by permanently changing the 
production pattern toward income-elastic goods and adjusting the product mix to 
changing domestic relative factor prices. It is primarily the latter requirement 
which has been met within Asia through the "flying geese" mode of cascading 
capital and technology flows from high-income to low-income countries 
following the product life cycle during which technology becomes standardised.  
As concerns intra-Asian trade, we can expect substantial shifts in the 
composition of intra-Asian trade following this pattern. A first impression of the 
direction of this sectoral shift can be gained if changes in the shares of two 
product groups in total exports of two Asian country groups are compared. 
Product groups are differentiated by factor intensity (textile and clothing being 
relatively labour-intensive and machinery and transport equipment being relative 
human capital-intensive) and country groups are differentiated by income levels 
(the NIEs Hong Kong, Korea, Rep., Singapore, and Taipei, China as the higher 
income first generation countries and China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand 
as the catching up second generation countries).  3 
Figure 1 reveals the expected cascading effect. The share of clothing and textiles 
in total exports of the four NIEs declined from 24 per cent in 1980 to 17 per cent 
in 1992 while the share of machinery and transport equipment rose from 22 per 
cent to 43 per cent. At the same time, the second generation of successful 
exporters increased the share of clothing and textiles in their total exports from 9 
to 26 per cent; also the latter industry gained in importance – but its share 
remained lower than in the NIEs (5 and 24 per cent in 1980 and 1992, 
respectively). Putting the exports of the two country groups together, three 
quarters of textile and clothing exports originated from the NIEs in 1980 and 
only one quarter from the second-generation exporters. This distribution 
changed 
 
Figure 1 -  Shares of Two Product Groups in Total Exports of Two Asian Country Groups, 
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aThe NIEs include Hong Kong, Rep. of Korea, Singapore and Taipei, China.- bThe countries 
of the second generation include China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand. 




substantially until 1992 when the groups were almost at equal footing (51 to 49 
per cent). For machinery and transport equipment, only 16 per cent of combined 
exports came from the second-generation exporters in 1980. In this industry, too, 
progress was made in catching up via-à-vis the NIEs: second-generation 
exporters accounted for 27 per cent of total Asian machinery exports in 1992. 
The comparison also demonstrates the speed in which export patterns have 
changed during the eighties. 
Extending the period under observation to the seventies and disaggregating total 
trade by intra-Asian and extra-Asian trade should substantiate this change in the 
Asian export mix. In addition, it is useful to define different sub-regions in order 
to analyse how sectoral patterns change if China as well as the three Asian 
OECD member states are grouped as wider circles around the Asian core group 
of NIEs and ASEAN countries. Hence, Table 1 presents shifts in export 
composition since 1970 for four different sub-regions starting with the smallest 
region developing South, Southeast and East Asia ("Developing Other Asia") 
and adding to this group China, then Japan and finally Australia/New Zealand, 
to form the largest group.  
 
 5 
Table 1 - Sectoral Composition of Intra- and Extra-Asian Trade by Asian Sub-
Regions 6 
Table 1 continued 7 
Major observations are as follows: 
First, between 1970 and 1993, developing other Asia more than doubled the 
share of manufactured products in its intra-area trade from 35 per cent to 76 per 
cent. For the largest sub-region (developing other Asia, China and the three 
Asian OECD-member states)1, the corresponding increase was slightly smaller 
because of the initially larger share of manufactures (about 45 per cent), but 
nevertheless was still impressive.  
Second, in extra-area trade, total Asia's role as an exporter of the entire range of 
manufactures has been even more dominant. Declining world market prices for 
oil and other primary commodities  have contributed to the result that in 1993 
more than 90 per cent of Asian exports were manufactures (excluding iron and 
steel) compared to 60 per cent in 1970.  
Third, within manufacturing, traditional industries such as textiles and clothing  
lost heavily ground in intra-Asian trade relative to the most dynamic industry, 
machinery and transport equipment. In fact, while clothing, for instance, still 
reached a share of 4-6 per cent (depending on the sub-region) in 1993 compared 
to 1-2 per cent twenty years ago, machinery and transport equipment almost 
skyrocketed from 9 per cent to 35 per cent in intra-developing Asian trade and 
for 17 to 38 per cent, respectively if trade with and among the three OECD 8 
member states is taken into account. It should be kept in mind, however, that this 
product category includes both unskilled labour-intensive activities such as 
production of electronic components and sophisticated human capital-intensive 
production of state of the art machinery. It would go beyond the scope of this 
paper to analyse the sectoral composition of trade in this category in more detail. 
In doing this, it would be necessary to separate the service and know how 
component from the pure goods components. 
Fourth, including China in the sample strengthens the traditional segment of 
manufactures in intra-Asian trade (SITC 6 and 8) and reduces the modern 
segment but the impact is not strong because China has also emerged as a host 
for producing components for machinery.  
Fifth, food products, ores, non-mineral oils and fats have strongly declined as 
export industries within Asia and in exports outside Asia. So have fuels but 
given fluctuating world market prices, there much more volatility in the share of 
fuels. 
Sixth, a remarkably stable role in intra-Asian trade is played by the chemical 
industry (including petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals). Given the strong 
position of the US and EU suppliers, it does not come as a surprise that 
                                                                                                                                        
1  Korea, Rep. though already participating in the OECD framework is still included in 
developing other Asia. 9 
chemicals are much less important in extra-Asian exports than within Asia. The 
same can be said for iron and steel, yet with a lower weight in absolute terms 
than chemicals. 
Seventh, though the traditional export stronghold of Asia, clothing, has only 
underproportionately gained in extra-Asian trade, what is noteworthy is that in 
trade among Asian countries its share has been rising not only between 
developing and Asian OECD member countries but also between developing 
Asian countries. As clothing defined as SITC category 84 excludes trade in 
intermediate textiles, a rising share stands for a rising demand of Asian 
consumers for finished goods imported from neighbouring countries. 
Eighth, Australia and New Zealand have a small weight in intra-Asian trade 
since their export structure focuses on the overall declining segment of food. In 
this respect, they are complementary trading partners to the other Asian 
countries. If Australia and New Zealand are included in the sample food exports 
maintain a higher share in intra-Asian trade compared to trade among  the non-
OECD Asian countries.  
Overall, irrespective of whether the sample is widely or narrowly defined, the 
outstanding role of manufactures in intra-Asian trade remains unchallenged. 
This holds in particular for machinery and transport equipment while the 
traditional more resource-based manufactures have gained less. As a result, in 
1993, transport equipment and machinery on one hand and other manufactures 10 
(excluding chemicals) on the other hand stood almost at par in intra-area trade of 
all four regional clusters. Contrary to that, in 1970, the latter group of 
manufactures was twice to three times as important as the former. This 
highlights the enormous success of Asia to up-grade its export supply and by up-
grading to maintain the growth momentum in trade.  
2.  Individual Countries' Results 
Individual Asian countries cover a wide range of specialisation profiles in 
international trade, from commodity exporters to exporters of manufactures. To 
know whether institutionalised regionalism would impact on third countries, it is 
important to see to what extent specialisation profiles differ between trade 
within the region and trade with the rest of world (ROW). The less sectoral 
structures differ the more likely it is that trading patterns are not distorted by 
discriminatory trade policies and that intra-Asian trade is like global trade in a 
nutshell [see for a detailed discussion Kreinin, Plummer, 1994]. Table 2 
recording the sectoral composition of intra-Asian trade2 and trade with ROW for 
eight Asian countries at the end of eighties and early nineties (1989, 1993) 
allows for addressing the following questions: 
                                            
2  As always in analysing intra-Asian trade in detail, data deficiences emerge. Table 2 is 
based on COMTRADE data supplied by the International Trade Centre on CD-ROM. The 
list of partner countries excludes Australia and New Zealand and China, Taipei. Thus, 
there is underreporting of Asian trade volumes. However, as the bias is systematic it is 
assumed that the structural pattern is not distorted.   11 
Table 2 - Sectoral Structure of Selected Asian Countries' Exports and Imports 
to/from Asiaa and Rest of World) 12 
Table 2 continued 13 
Table 2 continued 14 
a.  Have Asian countries more specialised in exporting manufactures within the 
region than to the rest of world? If this were true, the ratio Asia/ROW in the 
last two columns for each reporting partner should exceed unity for total 
manufactures (last row: SITC 5 to 8 minus 67 and 68).  
Trade theory can give some hypotheses on the expected outcome. Traditional 
factor proportion theory would tend to give a positive answer because the rest 
of the world comprises relatively capital-abundant countries OECD countries 
importing more resource-based goods from developing Asia (excluding 
Japan). Hence trade would be of inter-sectoral type. Linder type of analysis 
focusing on similarities in income levels would support this view, too, as 
such similarities are larger within Asia than vis-à-vis ROW and thus would 
trigger more intra-industry type of trade within Asia with higher shares of 
manufactures in intra-regional trade than in exports to ROW. Yet, fine-tuning 
by skill intensities would require to differentiate not only between 
manufactures and non-manufactures but also between resource-based 
relatively unskilled manufactures (represented mainly by SITC categories 
6+8) and more sophisticated manufactures (SITC 7). The outcome could 
become furthermore diffuse because of developing Asia's exports to Japan 
which should be more similar to exports to ROW than to exports to other 
developing Asian countries. 15 
To begin with, the major assumption that non-manufactures play a larger role 
in the countries' exports to ROW than in exports to other Asian countries is 
not confirmed. All sample countries have more manufactures in their export 
supply to the rest of the world than within Asia. The outstanding example is 
Indonesia whose intra-Asian exports consisted of fuels by more than 40 per 
cent in 1993 while the fuel share in exports to ROW halved from 24 per cent 
in 1989 to about 12 per cent in 1993. This is not surprising since Indonesia is 
the only major oil producer in the region. Its supply has led to building up of 
processing capacities in neighbouring countries and has influenced the export 
patterns of these countries (most visibly in Singapore who has become an 
exporter of petrochemicals). Malaysia exporting processed fuels to other 
Asian countries falls into the same category. Overall, resource-based goods 
like food products, mineral ores, natural fibres, vegetable oils and fats, as 
well as a iron and steel (SITC 67) still play a larger role in intra-Asian trade 
of the sample countries than in trade with ROW.  
Japan does not strongly deviate from this pattern though, as can be expected 
for a resource-poor economy, the differences between its export pattern 
inside and outside Asia are negligible. A closer look into the Japanese pattern 
of exports within manufactures reveals that transport equipment and 
machinery (especially passenger vehicles, SITC 78) account for a larger share 
in exports to ROW than within Asia. This interesting phenomenon does not 
only reflect differentials in income level and supply patterns (inter-industry 16 
type) between Japan and the other Asian countries. It also demonstrates a 
substitution process between trade in goods and factor trade. Japan 
increasingly exports capital and technology to Asian countries (partly driven 
by the sharp yen appreciation) to build up own production capacities in these 
countries, for instance for automobiles. Thus, Asian countries' domestic 
production using Japanese technology substitutes for direct Japanese exports. 
Outside Asia this process can be observed, too, as the so-called Japanese 
transplants in the US and Europe show but it seems to be more advanced in 
Asia than outside Asia.  
Within the sample countries, sectoral patterns visibly differ. India, the 
country with the slowest structural change in exports, displays the traditional 
composition of exports based on the labour-intensive processing of resource-
based manufactures (SITC 6+8). This pattern in invariant with respect to the 
direction of trade toward Asia or ROW. Malaysia represents the other pole of 
the scale. It has specialised in producing components for the electronic 
industry (SITC 7) with strong vertical links both within Asia and – to an even 
larger extent – to ROW. Traditional Malaysian export industries such as 
vegetable oils and fats have declined in importance in both regions. A third 
pattern is represented by Korea, Rep. The country has not only succeeded in 
concentrating more than half of its ROW exports and almost one third of its 
intra-Asian exports on machinery and transport equipment. Next to Japan, it 
is also the first Asian economy which has established an internationally 17 
competitive automobile industry exporting cars outside Asia. In 1993, the 
automobile sector (SITC 78) accounted already for almost 7 per cent of 
Korean total exports but until 1993 exports of Korean cars within Asia did 
not yet figure prominently. The Korean export pattern reveals another 
peculiarity: the relatively high share of standardised resource-based 
manufactures in its intra-Asian trade (SITC 6+8) basically influenced by its 
large heavy industries (SITC 67: iron and steel). Except for Japan, no other 
sample country has such a high share of iron and steel have in its exports to 
Asian countries (about 10 per cent). Interestingly enough, iron and steel 
played a much smaller role in Korean exports to ROW. It is likely that 
barriers to market entry in OECD countries with large domestic heavy 
industries are partly responsible for this discrepancy between the iron and 
steel share in Korean exports inside and outside Asia. Furthermore, keeping 
in mind that industrial policies have taken a strong influence on the Korean 
steel industry, the iron and steel case underlines that trade patterns in Asian 
countries are not only influenced by market-driven "flying geese" movements 
but also by deliberate industrial policy decisions.  
Symmetry instead of discrepancies in the sectoral pattern of exports directed 
to the two regions is demonstrated by the Thai and Singaporean case. In 
Thailand, the food industry declined in importance as exporter to the Asian 
region and ROW while symmetrically both resource-based industries (for 
instance, textiles and clothing) and machinery (including components for the 18 
electronic industry) experienced a parallel rise. The same parallelism can be 
observed in Singapore.  
To summarise, it comes as no surprise that Asian countries have become 
strong exporters of manufactures world-wide. Beyond this general 
observation, however, differences emerge with respect to whether either 
traditional labour-intensive products still dominate (basically in South Asian 
countries) or sophisticated products have already gained scope (automobile 
production in Korea Rep., for instance). Apart from these differences, some 
Asian countries  have specialised in exports of components of electronics 
(Malaysia, Thailand) or have focused on iron and steel (Korea Rep.) 
Differences between the export patterns inside and outside Asia can be 
observed basically for three product groups: fuels (Indonesia), iron and steel 
(Korea Rep., Japan) and automobiles. It can be assumed that for the two latter 
groups trade policies explain why export structures differ by destination of 
exports. Access to European and US markets for iron and steel, is impeded by 
trade measures whereas such restrictions exist in emerging Asian car markets 
in order to grant domestic car manufacturers infant industry protection. The 
fuel case is special. Strong demand in neighbouring net oil-importing 
countries and the availability of processing facilities in these countries are 
likely to be responsible for the fact that the share of oil in Indonesian exports 
is larger for exports to the region rather than outside Asia. 19 
b. To what extent do import patterns differ among Asian countries and do they 
differ with respect to the origin of products? 
First, what all sample countries have in common is that the share of 
manufactures has been higher in imports from Asia than from ROW. Thus, 
the Asia ROW ratio for manufactures exceeds unity in all cases. Even more 
important, only in a single case (Korea Rep.) this ratio has been declining 
between 1989 and 1993. This indicates how important the region has become 
for all countries as a supplier of technology and services embodied in 
manufactures. 
Second, except for Pakistan (in 1989) and Japan, the Asia/ROW ratio for 
machinery and transport equipment, the most sophisticated industry sub-
sector, always exceeds the ratio for total manufactures. That means that the 
large importance of this sub-sector in imports from Asia relative to imports 
from ROW is even higher for total manufactured products. Again, this shows 
how much advanced trade in sophisticated products has become within Asia. 
Third, automobiles originating from Asia play an increasingly important role 
in the basket of imports from Asia relative to automobiles imported from 
ROW. While the absolute share is still small, the mushrooming of 
automobiles plants all over Asian countries makes it increasingly difficult for 
non-Asian suppliers to defend their trade shares.  20 
Fourth, in imports from ROW, food products have a larger weight than in 
imports from  Asia. This segment of trade must not necessarily comprise so-
called inferior products with declining income elasticities of demand or raw 
products which are not produced in Asia. Food products can have a high 
value added component including "image value" and therefore, like luxury 
consumer goods, may open non-Asian OECD countries such as France or 
Germany vast market opportunities just when per capita income levels 
continue to rise as fast as in the past. 
Fifth, in fuels, a sharp distinction between the two South Asian countries and 
rest of Asian countries becomes evident. Whereas for the latter group, the 
shares of fuels in imports from either Asia or ROW do no differ significantly, 
they are strikingly different for India and Pakistan. For both countries, their 
extra-Asia imports are much more characterised by fuels than their intra-
Asian imports. Thus, India and Pakistan import fuels from the geographically 
nearby Middle East region while the other Asian countries split their sourcing 
of fuels more equally between Asian and non-Asian sources. Whether this is 
only due to distance factors or whether also financial and  trade policy factors 
play a role cannot be decided here. 
Overall, the findings on the import side confirm what has been said above for 
exports. Non-Asian suppliers have stronger positions in raw materials and food 
whereas Asian suppliers dominate the import pattern in manufactures. This 21 
difference appears to be essential especially in sophisticated goods (SITC 7). 
Differences between South Asian countries and other Asian countries are 
noteworthy. Again, this has emerged on the export side, too. 
3.  The Export Supply of Taipei, China 
One of the four NIEs, Taipei, China, is not included as reporting country in the 
UN trade statistics (COMTRADE) which were used for the aforementioned 
analyses. Nor are recent national trade statistics which are recorded in the 
Harmonised System (HS) fully compatible with the SITC scheme. Furthermore, 
no official trade with China and some other Asian countries is registered. For 
these reasons, the sectoral composition of Taipei, China's trade with Asia and 
the rest of the world  is separately discussed in the following. To achieve a 
maximum of compatibility with Table 2, HS trade statistics of 1993 were 
converted into the SITC scheme.  
Overall, there are some distinct differences in the structure of trade with Asia 
and non-Asia. First, as in other Asian countries too, food items while declining 
in importance, play a larger role in the economy's exports to Asian than to ROW 
(Table 3). This result is exclusively due to the importance of food exports to 22 
Table 3 23 
Table 3 continued 24 
Japan which in 1993 accounted for more than a quarter of total exports to Japan. 
In exports to all other Asian partners, food items were negligible. 
Second, conversely, machinery items (SITC 7) which include electronics were 
more dominant in exports  to non-Asia than to the Asian trading partners. This 
reflects the economy's strong specialisation in computer industries which are 
targeted to satisfy the lower-price segment in consumer demand of OECD 
countries in Europe and the US. 
Third, traditionally, other manufactures (SITC 6 and 8) including textiles, 
clothing, footwear and other finished goods, have used to be the traditional 
major export base in trade with non-Asian OECD countries (about two third in 
1970) as well as in trade with Asia (almost half of total exports). Over time, 
however, these relatively labour-intensive and  unskilled goods lost their 
relevance for Taipei, China. In 1993, they accounted for only little more than 
one third in exports to both regions. This shift reflects the response to the 
pressure to adjust and upgrade the export supply after strong real exchange rate 
appreciation and the increasing competition from low-income Asian hosts 
(including China). 
Fourth, chemical products have emerged as important export items in intra-
Asian exports. They more than tripled their share from 3 per cent in 1970 to 11 
per cent in 1993. Their rise in exports to non-Asian countries were less 
spectacular, probably as noted above for other Asian countries, too, due to 25 
strong domestic industries in OECD countries protected by policy-induced 
access restrictions.  
Fifth, export patterns vis-à-vis Asian trading partners do not fully overlap with 
each other. Given large disparities in income levels and resource endowment 
between these trading partners, such overlaps could not be expected. However, 
notwithstanding the disparities, differences are striking in some cases. 
Machinery exports to the Philippines, for instance, accounted for 30 per cent of 
total exports, compared to 10 per cent in exports to Sri Lanka and more than 60 
per cent to Singapore. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to discuss causes of 
such differences but apart from income differentials and policy factors, 
microeconomic determinants such as intra-firm trade and vertical inter-country 
specialisation in the electronics industries should be taken into consideration.  
Sixth, the import side yields less sector-specific concentration than the export 
side. Over the entire period, Taipei, China has imported both commodities and 
manufactures from Asia, increasingly focusing more on the latter than on the 
former. Volatility of fuel shares as demonstrated by more than one third in total 
imports from non-Asian countries in 1982 compared to only 9 per cent in 1993 
mirrors substantial fluctuations in oil prices. Interestingly enough, unlike other 
Asian economies, Taipei, China has satisfied its oil demand basically from non-
Asian sources. As in exports, machinery products play the largest role in the 
import basket, not only in imports from the Japan and the other three NIEs but 26 
also in imports from countries like the Philippines. The latter share may again be 
explained by vertical specialisation between the two economies which results in 
exporting labour-intensive components for the electronic industry from lower 
income countries to Taipei, China. 
Seventh, there is no such clear distinction between the sectoral pattern of 
imports from either Asia nor non-Asia. This may be due to the high level of 
aggregation but also to the advanced stage of some Asian trading partners (NIEs, 
Japan) exporting capital goods to the economy which match the technological 
standard of non-Asian suppliers.  
Finally, similarities in trading patterns between intra-Asian and extra-Asian 
trade also exist with respect to the growth rates.3 They were higher in the first 
sub-period and fairly equal with respect to either intra-Asian or extra-Asian 
trade. As a result, except for imports of fuels, Taipei, China fits well into the 
overall picture of NIEs with their permanent upgrading of export supply both 
within Asia as well as vis-à-vis non-Asian OECD countries. 
 
                                            
3  Tables on growth rates are available from the authors upon request. 27 
III. Driving Factors Behind the Expansion of Intra-Asian Trade 
1.  Intra-Asian Trade in a Long-Term Perspective 
In recent years, it has become widely common to call the expansion of intra-
Asian trade spectacular. Principally, this label has been derived from a specific 
sub-segment of intra-Asian trade, i.e., growth of trade in manufactures among 
the non-OECD Asian countries since 1980. In fact, excluding Japan, Australia, 
and New Zealand, intra-Asian trade in manufactures (comprising the four NIEs, 
ASEAN-4, PR China, and South Asia) as share of their total manufacturing 
trade rapidly rose from 22 per cent in 1980 to 36 per cent in 1993 [UN, Monthly 
Bulletin, May 1995]. This was roughly the same absolute increase (but from a 
lower starting point) as intra-Western European trade during the early days of 
EEC/EFTA integration (from 53 per cent in 1958 to 68 per cent in 1973). 
Doubts about how unique recent intra-Asian trade expansion really was can be 
raised if a long-term view covering all Asian countries is taken. Anderson and 
Norheim [1993: 29] based on Norheim et al. [1993: 436 seq.] have estimated 
pre- and post-war shares of intra-Asian exports and imports (comprising both 
OECD and non-OECD countries, from 1928 onward. They reveal shares ranging 
between 46 per cent in 1928 and 52 per cent in 1938, declines to 39 and 37 per 
cent in 1948 and 1968 respectively, a rise to 47 per cent in 1963, and since the 
end of the seventies a continuous increase up to 50 cent in 1993 (the latter 
figures estimated by the WTO Secretariat [1995: 39]. 28 
Long-term "steady-state" intra-area trade shares of 40-50 per cent for total Asia 
give rise to the question whether there are basically the two normal driving 
forces behind the increase used in gravity models, i.e. "mass" (rising absorptive 
capacity resulting from rapid economic growth) and "proximity" (comparative 
advantages of trade between countries sharing common borders and cultural 
affinity). Such normality can be broken by policy factors either banning 
neighbourhood trade entirely or indirectly impeding trade by inward-looking 
policies. Apart from the two gravitational factors, there is a third factor driving 
or impeding intra-area trade, that is built-in stabilisation and inertia toward 
volatility. Such stability can be based, for instance, on specific technologies 
established within the region which would link net importers of technology to 
the supplier of technology. A relatively price inelastic demand for technology 
embodied in capital goods would protect intra-area trade against external shocks 
and thus would form a solid fundament from which intra-area trade could grow 
further subject to improvements in absorptive capacity, shorter economic 
distance and policy driven trade liberalisation. 
2.  Economic Growth as an Engine to Intra-Asian Trade 
Studies on reverse causality between trade and economic growth have a long 
tradition in international economics. In one direction, exposure to international 
markets triggers economic growth through productivity increases delaying 
depreciation periods of the existing capital stock, access to modern know how 29 
and buoyant markets, and easing financial constraints in favour of new 
technology incorporated in imports of capital goods. In the other direction, 
growth triggers trade as both supply structures and consumer demand become 
more differentiated with rising per capita income thereby stimulating intra-
industry trade which has been shown to be less vulnerable to protection and 
more income-elastic than inter-industry trade. Intra-industry trade has been 
observed as an important contributing factor to intra-Asian trade expansion at all 
levels of per capita income [Campbell, 1986; Langhammer, 1989, 1995; 
Fukasaku, 1992; Lloyd, 1993]. 
Ceteris paribus, neighbouring trade is expected to particularly benefit from 
growth impulses. This is likely to occur not only because of economic proximity 
but also because economic growth in one country usually has a positive spread 
effect on cross-border trade if there is complementarity in resource endowment 
or if the neighbouring country enjoys a simultaneous autonomous push to higher 
economic growth. In Asia, the concept of so-called growth triangles [Arndt, 
1993; Tang, 1995: 199-200], for instance, has been subject to both determinants, 
spread effects and parallelism in growth. Hence, we would expect somewhat 
stable ex-post income elasticities of intra-area trade which would hold for all 
regions irrespective of additional policy support from regional trading 
arrangements.  30 
Table 4 records estimates of such elastiticities for the three major economic 
regions, Western Europe, Asia and the Americas, during the seventies and 
eighties. This period has been chosen to exclude the early push in intra-
European trade coming from institutionalised integration in Western Europe 
between 1957 and 1968 when the free trade area and the customs union were 
formed simultaneously. The following period 1970-85 showed a relative 
standstill in European integration deepening. Overall, the estimates support the 
hypothesis of a stable relationship between GDP growth and intra-area trade 
growth for all regions, irrespective of differences in economic growth and levels 
of integration. Elasticities were higher for Asia in the seventies when 
commodity trade 
 
Table 4 – Ex-Post Income Elasticitiesa of Intra-Area Trade in Asia, the Americas, and 
Europe, 1970-90 
 1970/82  1982/90  1970-90 
Asiab 1.59  1.08  1.39 
Americasc 1.33  1.12  1.28 
Western Europed 1.23  1.06  1.16 
aRatio between average annual rates of growth of intra-area trade (exports and imports) 
and nominal GDP. – bAsia: East, Southeast and South Asia, Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand, China. – cAmericas: US, Canada, Latin America. – dEurope: EEC and EFTA. 
Source:  UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, current 
issues. UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, current issues. Own calculations. 
 
(including oil) played a large role but were roughly at par with the two regions 
in the eighties when trade in manufactures became much more relevant. Over 
the entire period, intra-Asian trade responded slightly more to economic growth 31 
than did intra-American or intra-European trade. This might be due to the fact 
that in Asia "natural" costs of transactions within the region were 
overproportionately reduced or that trade liberalisation had a larger scope in 
Asia than elsewhere. It should be noted that Table 1 refers to merchandise trade 
only. Trade in non-factor services is not taken into consideration. This is a 
serious gap though some services are embodied in the sense that they are part of 
merchandise trade. Yet, technological innovations in telecommunication makes 
larger parts of formerly embodied services disembodied or separated. They are 
traded cross-border without movements of producers or consumers to consumers 
or producers. Though liberalisation of factor flows and here especially the rights 
of establishment for foreign investors are good proxies for the growing 
importance of non-factor services in intra-Asian trade it is impossible to record 
disembodied as well as embodied trade in such services satisfactorily. In many 
cases, the economic transactions underlying payments from residents to non-
residents are unknown if such transactions are separated from geographical 
movements of goods and persons. Hence, one can only guess that trade in 
services within Asia grows at least as rapidly as in world trade [for the latter see 
GATT, International Trade, 1994a: Table 2]. 32 
3.  Declining Transaction Costs in Asia 
a.  Bridging geographical distances 
There is much empirical evidence that the costs of bridging geographical 
distance were sizeably reduced in Asia during the last two decades. The most 
relevant cost factor for merchandise trade in Asia, maritime transport, has not 
been excluded from this development. Sien and Trace [1988: 142] report the 
emergence of new shipping lines, especially in East and Southeast Asia, over-
supply in tonnage caused by widespread subsidisation of shipbuilding in many 
Asian countries and concomitant declines in freight rate levels in both bulk and 
liner trade. Furthermore, there was ongoing containerisation and other logistical 
improvements especially in Asian coastal trade including massive modernisation 
of port services. Trade in such services has rapidly grown. Finally, with rising 
value added per weight unit of cargo, transport costs lost in importance anyway.  
As there is no major land-locked trading partner in Asia and as relatively high 
costs of domestic surface transport do not appear in trade statistics, one would 
expect cif/fob ratios to be a proxy for the ad valorem incidence of transport 
costs. Philippine trade statistics offer access to this issue as imports are recorded 
both on cif and fob basis. Earlier work of the author on measuring this incidence 
based on cif-fob ratios of Philippine imports in 1970 and 1983 has shown, 
however, that transport costs of imports of manufactures from Japan, for 
instance, were not lower in 1983 than in 1970, except for SITC 8 products. 33 
[Langhammer, 1987]. This finding is not surprising given the steep rise of 
energy prices in 1973 and 1979. Overall, follow-up estimates of cif-fob ratios 
for selected Philippine manufactured imports from Asian sources suggest 
transport costs to have slightly declined for some bilateral trade routes (imports 
from Japan, China Taipei, Australia, Korea), albeit with larger volatility for 
small volumes of trade in individual items (Table 5). In many cases, costs of 
loading and unloading in parts are higher than costs of moving goods through 
maritime transport. Usually, such port services are separately included in non-
factor service if payments to non- residents are made. Thus, the ad valorem 
incidence of transport costs measured by cif-fob ratios does not capture the full 
impact of costs related to moving goods cross-border. 
Next to costs of transport of goods, costs of exchanging information through 
telecom networks are relevant. Costs of information are expected to have 
declined drastically because of better hardware (Asian satellite networks), new 
software (facsimile, e-mail, internet), rising economies of scale, rapidly growing 
intra-Asian foreign direct investment in services specialised in selling 
information (trading houses, tourist agencies, subsidiaries of airlines, shipping 
lines) and, last not least, because of an increasing flow of people acting as 
tourists, traders or  
 34 
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migrants. This is an extremely heterogeneous cluster of factors impacting upon 
costs of information and therefore difficult to specify numerically. Table 6 
displays a specific component of information costs, that is, developments in 
 
Table 6   –  Indicators of Telecom Network Supply and Demand in Asian 
  Countries (annual average growth rates), 1982-1991 
 Indicators 
  1 2 3 4 
Hong Kong  48.5  29.4  n.a.  5.5 
Korea, Rep. of  35.3  39.1  5.3  13.9 
Singapore 13.7  32.4  10.7  5.0 
Taipei,  China  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
China,  P.R.  n.a. 53.5  n.a. 13.7 
Indonesia 19.8a 31.2  19.5b 9.1 
Malaysia 53.4  32.7  -22.0  9.8 
Philippines n.a.  23.9  n.a.  0.8 
Thailand  11.9 36.7 21.9 13.3 
India 84.7c 31.0d n.a.  6.9 
Pakistan  n.a. 28.8  n.a. 10.7 
Sri Lanka  5.7  35.1  2.0  5.3 
Japan n.a.  27.1  n.a.  2.5 
Australia 42.3e 24.3 -10.0  2.9 
New Zealand  n.a.  20.6e n.a.  2.0 
1 = Number of private leased circuits for data transmission. 
2 = Outgoing international traffic (calls or minutes). 
3 = Income of local telecom services from data and facsimile per number of private  
leased circuits. 
4 = Telephone main lines per 100 inhabitants. 
a1985-91. - b1985-89. - c1982-86. - d1982-87. - e1982-90.  
Source: International Telecommunication Union, Yearbook of Common Carrier 
Telecommunication Statistics, 1982-91. Own calculations. 36 
telecom hardware supply and demand in Asia. Indicator 4 mirrors the expected 
rapid expansion of installed telecom capacity while indicators 1 and 2 show 
increasing demand for modern data transmission facilities and internationally 
orientated networks, respectively. Indicator 3 is the only monetary indicator, i.e., 
telecom income from user fees per leased circuit for data transmission. The 
proxy is difficult to interpret as it probably reflects the balance of diverging 
movements of declining prices (due to decreasing fixed costs) and rising prices 
due to improved quality of services. The latter factor seems to dominate. 
b.  Lowering costs of uncertainty 
Uncertainty is frequently discussed as a major impediment against trade because 
hedging requires insurance premia to be paid on forward markets. The usual 
indicator of uncertainty is volatility of real exchange rates. Such volatility can be 
provoked by a number of factors including short-term capital movements and 
asymmetrical real external shocks, as for instance, commodity price changes 
affecting commodity-rich and commodity-poor countries differently. As prices 
for tradables on domestic markets are excepted to move in the same direction 
(provided quantitative restrictions do not break the transmission mechanism in 
prices), it is the price for non-tradables or immobile resources (including 
differences in policies and government reputation) which causes real exchange 
rates to diverge. If such divergence is "path dependent" and thus follows a 
steady course over a longer period so that it can be anticipated by trading 37 
partners, costs of insurance against risks of exchange rate changes will be lower 
than under conditions of erratic unforeseeable volatility. Nevertheless, such 
costs will still be higher than between trading partners who are strongly 
integrated with each other on goods and factor markets (including labour) and 
whose real exchange rates reveal a high degree of convergence. In Europe, 
Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands are such strongly integrated trading 
partners. The two latter countries peg to the German currency under a de facto 
German wage standard. Asset holders are widely indifferent in preferring one 
currency over the other. 
Green [1994] has estimated convergence indicators (using the so-called 
standardised coefficient alpha based on Pearson correlation coefficients for 
economic variables across different pairs of countries) for both ASEAN-4 
(excluding Singapore) and the four large EU countries.4 He found increasing 
convergence in nominal and – to less extent – also real exchange rates since the 
seventies while within the EU such convergence did not exist. The latter finding 
is not surprising given sharp divergences in policies, reputation, preferences and 
prices for non-tradables between the UK and Italy on one side and France (vis-à-
vis Germany) on the other side using the German currency as the nominal 
                                            
4  Convergence is a medium-term concept and thus should not be equated to lack of short-
term exchange rate volatility. To measure valatility, one should embark upon estimates of 
short-term fluctuations around a trend measured from monthly or quarterly exchange rate 
changes. 38 
external anchor at least for the last decade. Green's proxy has been used for 
bilateral real effective exchange rates for the larger Asian sample (excluding the 
OECD countries). His findings for ASEAN-4 are strongly corroborated. Based 
on annual observations, real exchange rate changes of the four countries were 
significantly positively correlated during the 1981-94 period (Table 7). If 
Singapore is included to come to ASEAN-wide results, convergence ends. 
Singapore with its entirely different economic structure and different exchange 
rate targeting compared to ASEAN-4 has largely appreciated in real terms 
against the other four countries during the eighties. In terms of the initial target 
of the alpha coefficient, to assess how suitable individual country developments 
are for concluding on developments of the entire group, one can argue that the 
Singaporean exchange rate path does not allow to conclude on an "ASEAN 
path". 
Forming other sub-groups (Table 8), yields no parallelism in real exchange rates 
except for South Asia where the two major countries, India and Pakistan, 
maintain weak trade relations only. The four NIEs have followed different paths 
and thus have seen changes in their competitive position in world markets 
against each other. So did China, Hong Kong, and China Taipei with the 
strongest divergence in exchange rate movements. Taken all countries together, 
convergence is lower than for the ASEAN-4 subgroup but higher than for the 
Chinese group. There is no evidence from the estimates that Asian countries 
have formed a currency "bloc".  39 40 
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Table 8 – Standardised Alpha Coefficient for Real Exchange Rate Movements for Sub-
Regional Groups of Asian Countries, 1981-1994 
  Average value of bilateral 
correlation coefficients (r) 
Standardised alpha 
coefficient (α) 
NIEs-4 0.362  0.694 
ASEAN-4 0.910  0.976 
ASEAN-5 0.695  0.919 
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka  0.874  0.954 
China, P.R., China Taipei,      
Hong Kong  -0.216  -1.141 
All countries  0.350  0.866 




















k    =  number of countries 
ρij  =  Pearson correlation coefficient of real exchange rate movements between countries  i    
and  j. 
Source: See Table 7. 
 
 
It is important to note that exchange rate divergence seemingly did not impede 
trade which grew much faster within the Chinese group and among the NIEs 
rather than between the ASEAN-4 [Langhammer, 1995: Table 4]. This lends 
support to the hypothesis that costs of hedging against exchange rate 
divergences were relatively low because divergences were steady and could be 
anticipated. Large asymmetrical real shocks do not seem to have emerged in the 
eighties and early nineties. 42 
c.  Lowering costs of information on markets 
Knowledge on sourcing and export markets is a scarce resource sold 
professionally by trading houses and other service suppliers. Such external non-
party relations between sellers and buyers have a long tradition in Asia where 
Japanese and Chinese trading houses but also few European trading houses have 
started early to establish branches in all major countries. In addition, party-
related intra-firm flows of information exist between parent companies of FDI 
and their subsidiaries or joint ventures on one side and between the latter on the 
other side. Hence, irrespective of intra-firm trade in goods reported by Japanese 
investors [Ramstetter, 1993], FDI in general helps to lower costs of information 
inside multinational companies. Growth of intra-Asian FDI can thus be used as a 
proxy for decline in transaction costs due to information gaps. A recent 
UNCTAD publication reports an increase of the share of nine major East and 
Southeast Asian countries in inward FDI stock of the same countries from 30 per 
cent in 1980 to 45 per cent in 1993 [UNCTAD, 1995, Table 4]. China, and the 
ASEAN countries became major hosts of Asian investors while Asian second 
generation capital exporters (following Japan) directed significantly higher 
amounts of their investment to Asian countries. Reportedly, by 1991, Korea, for 
instance, had 47 per cent of its outward FDI stock in East, South and Southeast 
Asia and the Pacific after only 11 per cent in 1987 [ibid: 12]. 43 
Within total FDI, investment in some service sectors directly attributes to bridge 
economic distance, for instance in general services, banking/insurance, 
commerce and transportation. In fiscal year 1993, Asia's share in world Japanese 
investment in these four service industries  amounted to 11 per cent compared to 
10 per cent in FY 1991. Although the dynamics of Japanese service investment 
has still been outside Asia, almost one third of the total Japanese investment 
stock in Asia is already in these service industries [Ministry of Finance, current 
issues]. As mentioned above, trade in services including consumer services 
(travelling, tourism) is an important driving force of merchandise trade, too. In 
this respect, liberalisation in trade in capital is super-additive to liberalisation in 
trade in goods. 
d.  Dismantling trade barriers 
Tariffs and NTBs are policy-induced measures and impact upon transaction 
costs. Dismantling them, has a positive effect upon trade provided that there is 
neither "water in the tariff" nor other redundancy. Intra-area trade can be 
expected to benefit overproportionately if trade barriers make advantages of 
short economic distance ineffective. During the last decade, many Asian 
countries have been heralded for lowering trade barriers from an initial level 
which used to be higher than in Europe and the US. Two movements have to be 
distinguished. First, Asian countries lowered tariffs and NTBs autonomously 
since the UR was launched. This happened either under non-GATT-notified 44 
international commitments (i.e., within structural adjustment programs) or even 
without any external commitments. Such measures were taken outside the UR 
negotiations [OECD, 1991] and resulted in applied tariff rates which were below 
the bound rates agreed upon in the previous Tokyo Round. Among the 72 
countries which notified autonomous trade liberalisation measures or made such 
endeavours otherwise publicly known, were Australia, Bangladesh, China, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea Rep., Macao, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, China Taipei and Thailand [GATT, 1993, 
Appendix Table 3]. 
Second, within the UR, Asian countries offered a large coverage of imports 
subject to bound tariffs and further reduction of tariff which were already bound. 
Table 9 lists pre- and post UR tariff rates (as weighted averages of applied and 
bound rates). They vary largely among the individual countries, ranging between 
Hong Kong as the only economy without any tariffs on industrial products and 
India which had the highest pre-UR tariff rate and will cut tariff by more than 
half. Indonesia which offered large portions of its imports to be subject to tariff 
binding (coverage of bound rates in the industry sector: 93 per cent of tariff 
lines) do not show tariff reductions. Unlike Latin American countries which has 
offered 100 per cent tariff binding, Asian countries will still maintain more 
scope for tariff 
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manoeuvring as only 68 per cent of tariff lines and 70 per cent of imports are 
under bound rates. Yet, this is a large improvement compared to the pre-UR 
period when only 16 per cent of tariff lines and 32 per cent of imports were 
under bound rates in Asia [GATT, 1994: Table II.11]. The two economies still 
most reluctant to bind tariffs are Sri Lanka and Hong Kong (Table 8) but the 
latter is a free trader and the former has little leverage to influence neighbouring 
countries' trade policies. 
Commenting on tariff reductions and binding only, yields an incomplete picture. 
As in all trading partners, NTBs are supposed to be more relevant as trade 
barriers. Given the myriad of different NTBs, commitments towards phasing out 
of specific NTBs are not reported for Asian countries. However, evidence from 
past dispute settlement procedures and from various trade policy reviews of the 
GATT for Asian countries suggest that they have been more subject to NTBs 
launched by non-Asian countries than initiator of own measures [GATT, 1993: 
Appendix Table 4: 48]. Again, it is very likely that Asian countries will continue 
to scrap NTBs autonomously without binding them in the WTO under 
reciprocity constraints. Yet, in assessing the effects of unilateral and multilateral 
measures, one should not assess their effects on taking the legal measures as a 
yardstick. Customs drawbacks and export processing zones are instruments 
which yield that the effectively collected tariff is much lower than the legal 
tariff. Due to data shortages, it is always the latter and not the former rate which 47 
is applied as the point of departure. If the former were available, the 
liberalisation rate would probably be smaller. 
4.  Technological Ties among Asian Countries: A Built-in Stabiliser? 
Asia-originating technology is widely spread throughout Asia and – following 
empirical analyses – constitutes a strong factor of stability in intra-Asian trade. 
For instance, Lee [1995: 6] in an analysis of the impact of yen appreciation upon 
the Korean economy – based on an Korean input-output table of 1990 – has 
found that the elasticity of induced imports per unit of Korean exports was 
higher (0.33) than for domestic demand (0.18 for consumption and 0.28 for 
investment). Overall, the average import coefficient of total final demand in 
Korea was almost three times as high as in Japan (0.25 compared to 0.09). 
Hence, for Korea, export growth is found to trigger growth of imports. Korean 
imports basically encompass capital goods 40 per cent of which are from Japan. 
Lee argues that Korea has been "chronically and inevitably dependent upon 
Japanese sources" [ibid:, 7] as it has been witnessed by price inelasticity of 
Korean imports from Japan and, as a result, by bilateral trade deficits becoming 
larger with Korean Won depreciation against the Japanese Yen. It can be safely 
assumed that Japanese or other Asian countries' technologies have been installed 
in a number of neighbouring countries. Growth of finished goods exports from 
East Asia to intra- and extra-area destinations will therefore stimulate intra-
Asian trade in industrial materials, intermediate goods and also services. Such 48 
built-in stabiliser in intra-Asian trade can be expected to consolidate with 
ongoing up-grading of the Asian export supply. Sectorally, the automotive 
industry is likely to play a central role in intra-Asian technological ties but 
telecommunication industries may follow suit. With Japanese technology being 
present in the neighbouring markets from the very beginning, intra-Asian trade 
in the following years has benefited from initial conditions of strong 
technological ties to Asian sources which remained robust. A precondition for 
maintaining such ties was similarity in relative prices of tradables between Asian 
countries and openness of trading partners to international markets. Within East 
Asia, there are few "islands" only in which this precondition is not yet met. In 
the PR China, for instance, where state-owned enterprises (SOEs) often still rely 
on old Soviet energy-intensive technology and where energy prices to be paid by 
SOEs deviate from world market prices, exporters of energy-intensive 
technology have defended markets. In 1992, almost 50 per cent of Russian 
exports to China consisted of machinery and transport equipment probably used 
in SOEs while Russia's exports to OECD markets, however, were almost 
entirely based of commodities and near-commodities. With the ongoing opening 
of the Chinese market to international sourcing, energy-intensive technology is 
going to be wiped out thus offering market prospects for Asia-originating state 
of the art technology.  49 
IV. Third Country Effects of Intra-Asian Trade Expansion 
As shown above, regional income growth and non-discriminatory reduction of 
trade barriers have triggered import demand in many Asian countries which was 
increasingly satisfied by purchases of goods originating from the region. In the 
static view of the customs union theory, growth of intra-area imports can be 
either at the expense of domestic production (trade creation) or imports from 
third countries (trade diversion). In the absence of regional integration, however, 
there is no reason to argue that policy-induced preferences might have fuelled 
intra-Asian trade to the detriment of non-Asian suppliers. 
Unilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation offered both Asian and non-Asian 
countries ample prospects to expand trade. This could be expected, partly 
because of catching up processes from low initial levels of trade, partly because 
Asian countries proved to be more successful to adapt their supply mix to Asian 
demand conditions than did suppliers from high-income non-Asian OECD 
countries. As a result, ex post income elasticities of demand for intra-Asian 
imports have not only been higher in the eighties compared to the seventies. In 
addition, for all major industrial products, they have also been higher than 
demand elasticities for extra-Asian imports. This is witnessed by estimates for 
the sub-region "other developing Asia" which includes the ASEAN countries, 
the NIEs and South Asia (Table 10). Again, it is important to note that declining 
demand elasticities for extra-Asian imports in the 1982-93 period compared to 50 
the previous sub-region 1970-82 could only be interpreted as trade diversion if 
unlike in the seventies, the eighties had been characterised by regional 
integration in Asia. Such distinction, does not exist and hence such decline 
reflects market influences but not policy interventions in favour of intra-Asian 
trade. 
Table 10–Ex-Post Income Elasticities of Demand of Developing Other Asia for Intra-Asian 
and Extra-Asian Imports, by SITC-Categories, 1970-1993a 
SITC,   Elasticities  SITC,    Elasticities 












           
0 - 9  1982-1993  2.6  1.4  6 + 8  1982-1993  3.2  1.6 
 1970-1982 1.6  1.4   1970-1982 3.0  2.2 
 Difference 1.0  0.0   Difference 0.2  -0.6 
           
0 + 1  1982-1993  1.9  0.9  65  1982-1993  3.2  0.9 
 1970-1982 1.0  1.0   1970-1982 1.4  0.8 
 Difference 0.9  -0.1   Difference 1.8  0.1 
           
2 + 4  1982-1993  1.4  1.2  67  1982-1993  2.6  1.8 
 1970-1982 1.0  1.2   1970-1982 1.7  1.2 
 Difference 0.4  0.0   Difference 0.9  0.6 
           
4 1982-1993 1.3  0.2  68  1982-1993 2.6  1.8 
 1970-1982 1.9  0.9   1970-1982 2.0  1.1 
 Difference  -0.6  -0.7   Difference 0.6  0.7 
           
3 1982-1993 0.7  -0.1  84  1982-1993 4.7  0.7 
 1970-1982 2.3  2.4   1970-1982 1.5  1.4 
 Difference  -1.6  -2.5   Difference 3.2  -0.7 
           
5  1982-1993  3.4  1.6  5 + 6 + 7 +   1982-1993  3.5  1.8 
  1970-1982  1.6  1.3  8 - 67 - 68  1970-1982  1.7  1.3 
 Difference 1.8  0.3    Difference 1.8  0.5 
          
7  1982-1993  3.7  2.0      
  1970-1982  2.1  1.4      
  Difference  1.6  0.6      
        
aRatio between average annual rates of growth of imports and nominal GDP. 
Source:  See Table 4, World Bank, World Bank Tables, current issues. Own calculations. 51 
However, there is no doubt that for non-Asian suppliers, developing Asia 
became the major absorptive market in the eighties and early nineties. 
Developing Asia's share in EU manufactured exports almost doubled from 8 to 
15 per cent between 1980 and 1993 while the US starting from a higher initial 
base concentrated 18 per cent of its manufactured exports on developing Asia in 
1993 after almost 12 per cent thirteen years ago (Table 11). Export growth to 
China were in similar 
 
Table 11 – Share of Asian Countries in US and EU Exports, 1980-1993 
  US EU 
  Total  trade  Manufactures  Total  trade  Manufactures  












1980  9.5  12.6 5.7  11.8 2.2 7.1 2.4 8.1 
1990  12.3 15.5  9.5 15.1  5.4 11.1  5.7 11.9 
1991  11.5 16.1  8.9 15.7  5.1 11.7  5.4 12.5 
1992  10.8 16.5  8.2 16.4  4.7 12.5  4.8 13.3 
1993  10.5 17.8  7.8 18.3  4.6 14.5  4.8 15.3 
Source: UN, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, current issues. 
 
dimensions. Such increases cannot be observed for US and EU exports to Japan 
which in terms of shares rose by two percentage points at the maximum. Given 
the more competitive production structure of Japan and other OECD countries 
(relative to the structure of developing Asia and OECD countries), trade 52 
resistance factors may have played a larger role in mitigating growth of exports 
to Japan. 
Merchandise trade comprises only part of non-Asian export growth to Asia. 
Both "disembodied" services as well as services embodied in goods exports 
originating from Europe and the US have found open markets in Asia, too. This 
holds for services embodied in large infrastructure projects such as airports or 
urban mass transport systems and also for financial services, fairs and payments 
for intellectual property rights. A detailed analysis of German, Dutch and French 
exports of non-factor services to ASEAN countries in the eighties has revealed 
service exports to have even more rapidly increased than merchandise trade 
[Langhammer, 1991]. As services are income-elastic, further economic growth 
is likely to shift the structure of exports from non-Asia to Asia further to 
consumer and business services in addition to those services exports which help 
to remove infrastructural bottlenecks in Asia. 
V.  Forming Regional Integration Schemes in Asia: Economically 
Meaningful for Whom and for What? 
Unlike regional co-operation which basically comprises joint implementation of 
projects of supra-national scope and is already pursued within ASEAN, APEC 
and Asian groupings, the concept regional integration has neither been 
unchallenged nor fully enforced in Asia. Earlier than 1990, forming a regional 
trading block was not popular in Asian political circles nor was it achievable 53 
given the enormous heterogeneity of the countries in policies, size and structures 
of the economy, speed of growth and income levels. It was both the external 
threat carried through the risk of failure of the multilateral Uruguay Round and 
the internal pressure to sustain the momentum of earlier economic and political 
regional co-operation which resulted in a new perception of regional integration. 
The former gave rise to the idea of improving the retaliatory capacity in a 
scenario characterised by a possible failure of the UR and a restrictive stance of 
NAFTA and the European Single Market. The latter came from sub-regional co-
operation schemes formed against a possible threat from centrally planned 
economies in Asia and Europe. With the demise of the command economies and 
the successful conclusion of the UR, one could have expected to see the idea of 
regional integration vanishing, especially because intra-Asian trade – as shown 
above – enjoyed an unprecedented growth momentum without trade 
discrimination.  
Yet, meanwhile the idea has developed further and has materialised in two free 
trade targets, one for the ASEAN Free Trade Area AFTA in 2002 and one for 
the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area APEC in 2010 (for the developed partner 
countries) and 2020, respectively (for the remaining member countries). APEC 
includes the three NAFTA member states and is thus the holding for both 
NAFTA and AFTA. It excludes the South Asian member states of SARC which 
go their own way to enforce first steps of regional co-operation. Since the APEC 
summits of Bogor and Osaka specifying the steps to implement APEC, the 54 
wedge between South Asia on one hand and Southeast and East Asia on the 
other hand today seems deeper than between the Eastern and Western parts of 
the Pacific rim. It is important to note that in spite of developing the idea of 
regional and sub-regional integration further, Asian countries have never 
thought of building trading blocks. Nor would have it been within their realm to 
do so if they really wanted. To form a block, requires common policies taken 
against third countries. In trade integration, this is only possible by negotiating a 
customs union operating a common trade policy against non-member countries. 
To be successful, this way requires similar levels and structures of national 
tariffs. Such conditions usually hold if structures of production are as similar as 
income levels and if intra-area trade can be sheltered against internal 
protectionist forces by a large portion of intra-industry trade in total trade. Such 
similarities do not exist within Asia, at least not to the extent of conditions in 
Europe. Therefore, the only historical experience with a customs union of supra-
regional scope has been the European Economic Community. The EEC finalised 
a common external tariff by 1968 without, however, achieving a complete 
customs union earlier than 1992 when the Single Market led to common trade 
policies for all products (including cars, textiles and agricultural products). Such 
policies were often criticised by Asian countries as building fortresses and 
against the spirit of open regionalism. 
However, in spite of the Asian resistance to follow the trading block objective, it 
would be premature to call AFTA and APEC endeavours with parallel 55 
approaches but with different geographical dimensions. AFTA is still influenced 
by the traditional view to regional trading arrangements, that is, to cut national 
tariffs on industrial imports exclusively for imports from member countries by 
following a time schedule. APEC on the other hand, pursues open regionalism 
by offering member countries an "à la carte" approach of voluntarily liberalising 
trade in areas they accept and to incorporate such liberalisation into the 
multilateral framework, i.e. within the WTO. Such approach of adding to UR 
commitments an additional regional liberalisation "accelerator" comes close to 
the old idea of GATT-plus and was proposed by the Third Report of the 
Eminent Persons Group [Third Report, 1995]. As APEC does not confine 
liberalisation to the narrow issue of merchandise trade but extends its focus to 
capital mobility and rights of establishment, it shares some similarities with the 
European Economic Space (or Area) comprising EU and remaining EFTA 
countries. The EES and APEC aim at free movements of capital and goods as 
well as rights of establishment but exclude a common external trade policy. In 
contrast to the EES, APEC excludes free mobility of labour. Overall, AFTA and 
APEC seem more market-driven and private-sector driven (and less driven by 
public sectors) than any European or North American Treaty-type of integration. 
Nevertheless, one may ask why there is anyway an economic rationale for still 
pursuing open regionalism after the conclusion of the UR if such regionalism is 
substantially only a regional "turbo" to multilateral trade liberalisation. To 
answer this question, it is useful to distinguish between three different welfare 56 
viewpoints as the customs union theory does: the individual country point of 
view, the regional grouping point of view and, finally, the world welfare point of 
view. 
1.  The Individual Country Viewpoint 
a.  Terms of trade improvements 
Let us assume all Asian countries form a free trade area and trade diversion 
occurs: a low-cost non-Asian supplier C loses its market to a high-cost Asian 
supplier B after the removal of trade barriers to intra-Asian trade. The importing 
Asian country A may then collect terms of trade gains if prices of C depend on 
the volume of its exports. Hence, the small country assumption would not hold 
[Panagariya, 1993: 16]. To defend its markets in Asia, supplier C may be forced 
to lower its prices down to the level of country B which benefits from trade 
diversion. As a result, country A would enjoy lower import prices and thus 
improve its terms of trade. In addition, as B also removes its barriers against A, 
country B may collect terms of trade gains via lower import prices because 
supplier C is forced to charge B lower prices at the level of the supplier A. As a 
result, A and B gain through forming a free trade area and such gains would 
have not been possible through non-discriminatory treatment. 
b.  Overcoming the "principle supplier rule" dilemma 57 
Multilateral trade negotiations in the past have been characterised by the 
mercantilist behaviour of large high-income trading partners to offer 
concessions only to those equally large trading partners offering the maximum 
of counter-concessions (principal supplier rule). Before the Tokyo Round and 
again in the final stage of the Uruguay Round, only the Big Three achieved the 
breakthrough due to their mutual concessions. Under this behaviour, small 
lower-income Asian countries had neither the chance to gain better conditions 
for market access for their specific exports because they could not offer large 
domestic markets for products supplied by large trading partners. Nor were they 
inclined to make concession on a non-reciprocal basis. Instead, they behaved as 
free-riders enjoying the MFN principle without getting the maximum possible 
access to tradings partner's markets for products of their export interest. Small 
market size was not only associated with the absolute size of markets but also 
with large income differentials and different supply structures of large high-
income and small low-income partners. Asian countries could hope to receive a 
better response to their liberalisation offers from neighbouring countries at 
similar income levels. As a follow-up, dynamic gains of liberalisation 
(exploiting scale economies and specialisation gains) were thought to be easier 
to collect in the regional than in the multilateral context (without fully ignoring 
the latter, however). 
c.  Stabilising access conditions 58 
In the past, many Asian countries have preferred unilateral trade liberalisation 
over binding liberalisation multilaterally. As a result, countries apply tariff rates 
which are lower than bound rates and have thus maintained some scope for 
raising tariffs temporarily. Though countries committed themselves in the 
Uruguay Round to more tariff binding (see Table 9 above), the possibilities of 
tariff manoeuvring are still given. Regional free trade arrangements could bring 
more stability in access conditions because the distinction between applied and 
binding tariff rates on intra-area trade disappears. Once a time schedule for tariff 
removal is agreed upon, this is binding. Stable access conditions might be of 
considerable interest for the small member states which cannot negotiate with 
the larger Asian countries at equal footing in multilateral negotiations.  
d.  Stimulating trade in regionally important mobile resources 
There are goods and services which are of export interest to some Asian 
countries only in the context of neighbourhood trade. This comprises utilities 
such as water, waste, surface transport of gas through pipelines, electricity, but 
also telecommunication via regionally launched satellites and exploitation of 
marine resources. Given vast differences in resource endowment between 
neighbouring countries, regional trade liberalisation can mobilise a trade 
potential which would remain untapped under multilateral liberalisation. Laos as 
an exporter of secondary energy to Thailand, for instance, is a case in point. 
e.  Looking beyond merchandise trade 59 
Asian countries may expect more from regional trade liberalisation than only 
freeing merchandise trade. Unlike "traditional" free trade areas such as EFTA, 
modern" free trade areas as NAFTA use free trade in merchandise trade only as 
a starting point to liberalise regulations concerning free establishment of 
enterprises, capital mobility and stepwise relaxation of restrictions against 
labour movements and mutual recognition of standards. Going beyond narrow 
economic targets, regional agreements serve a political target, that is to contain 
large individual countries' power and to tie their hands through binding regional 
commitments. Early European integration in heavy industries such as iron and 
steel was very much driven by the political target to tie Germany´s hands. In 
Asia, the ASEAN example has shown that economic integration – regardless 
how modest the early efforts within the ASEAN PTA were – also aimed at 




2.  The Regional Viewpoint 
a.  Level playing field 
Early integration literature influenced by UNCTAD [1967] has given much 
scope to the improvement of collective bargaining power of developing 60 
countries toward OECD countries. While the disappointing results of many 
South-South integration schemes revealed deeper distributional conflicts among 
the member countries than between the member countries and OECD countries, 
this argument has not entirely lost its appeal. For instance, level playing field 
arguments are stressed in US trade policies and the formation of the Cairns 
Group in the Uruguay Round was motivated by the same endeavour to bundle 
national interests in order to achieve better bargaining results in a mercantilist 
world against OECD countries heavily protecting their declining industries. In 
Asia, ASEAN appears to have experienced some positive effects of bargaining 
collectively with the EU on market access in MFA-restricted textiles and 
clothing. ASEAN countries as a group were granted cumulative treatment under 
rules of origin, special ASEAN quotas and transferability of unused quotas from 
one ASEAN country to the other [Langhammer, 1985: 114-116]. Such 
measurable  benefits seem to have been small in magnitude but they add to the 
intangible benefits from having special negotiation channels with the EU under 
the dialogue partner system in the Post-Ministerial Meetings of ASEAN. 
Overall, an individual ASEAN country would have not been able to negotiate 
with the EU at such terms as ASEAN as a group could. But it also very likely 
that without the good individual performance of ASEAN countries the group as 
a whole would have not the leverage to negotiate with the EU (and also with 
other OECD countries) at equal terms. 61 
b.  Decoupling from weak engines of growth 
Lewis [1980] in his nobel prize lecture advocated South-South regional 
integration as a means to decouple from ageing OECD countries and their 
allegedly declining absorptive capacity. While his argument of a historical link 
between growth of industrial production in developed countries and growth in 
world trade with commodities has become widely obsolete with the emergence 
of manufactures in almost all developing countries' exports (except for Africa), 
decoupling from non-Asian OECD countries is still a topic. The argument has 
shifted from the trade sector to the monetary sector and focuses on decoupling 
from financial volatilities, business cycles and exogenous shocks. Given the 
declining importance of economic interactions between Asian countries and 
non-Asia and the reverse situation in intra-Asian interactions, Asian countries 
can face new problems of real shocks emerging inside Asia and hitting Asian 
countries asymmetrically because of differences in income and sectoral 
structures. Regional integration can smoothen the degree of asymmetry and lead 
to a more inter-country balanced distribution of the burden arising from such 
shocks.  
3.  The World Viewpoint 
a.  Regional integration as a complement to multilateralism 
The recent WTO study on interlinks between regional and multilateral 
liberalisation comes to a generally positive assessment of regional integration. If 62 
successful, regional integration was complementary to global integration rather 
than substitutive [WTO, 1995]. Regional integration was able to commit 
countries more strongly to liberalisation plurilaterally than was possible under 
the multilateral trading order. In particular, areas beyond merchandise trade were 
more deeply liberalised in the regional context. A good example is trade in 
services where the EU single market programme has led to true liberalisation 
unlike the multilateral approach concentrating on improving transparency and 
fixing MFN treatment first. On the other hand, the multilateral system was more 
successful in bringing these areas to a global agenda where (except for the most 
advanced EU integration) other regional schemes failed to include them in their 
programmes. TRIPS, TRIMS and dispute settlement figure prominently among 
these issues. Yet, there is no way to deny that a large number of South-South 
agreements were stuck in distributional conflicts and that serious disintegration 
processes could only be avoided because all member states were committed to 
the multilateral system. 
 
b.  Benefits to non-Asian countries 
By definition, regional integration has always an internal efficiency effect as 
well as an external discrimination effect. The latter is feared by non-Asia to 
exclude them from the Asian markets. However, there could be room for hope 
that the internal efficiency effect is so strong that is spreads to non-Asian 63 
countries and outweighs the discrimination effect. For instance, so-called net 
external trade creation could occur as a result of integration-induced income 
growth and a rising income elasticity of Asian demand for non-Asian goods and 
services. The growing importance of Asia as an export market for non-Asia 
(Table 11) bears witness to this point. Furthermore, non-Asia could enjoy terms 
of trade gains because of lower world market prices for capital and consumer 
goods due to intensified competition within Asia. 
VI. At the End: Is Regional Integration Recommendable for Asia? 
The positive theory of international organisation suggests that when individual 
countries decide on membership it is the entirely the national interest and not the 
interest of the region as a whole that matters in decision-making. Furthermore, it 
is not unlikely that small "marginal" member states act as freeriders as they can 
block decision-making without offering more to the region's welfare than they 
draw on resources from the region. Large countries act as leaders providing 
collective international goods for free. While they have a genuine economic 
interest in market expansion for their goods and services, they have to sacrifice a 
number of gross gains by redistribution to the "marginal" members and incurring 
losses because the burden of enforcing rules and compensating countries for 
losses rests primarily upon them. Are there such leaders in Asia and are they 
accepted in this position? Can regions or sub-regions be identified where 
conditions of natural trading partnership exist so that strong interactions would 64 
occur anyway without institutionalised integration? And finally, is the 
international environment conducive for accelerating regional integration in 
Asia?  
It seems that the latter question can be most easily answered. After the 
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, fears that outside Asia regional 
fortresses could be built up and threaten Asia's economic prospects have 
vanished. Neither has Europe emerged as a fortress nor is NAFTA such a threat 
after its inclusion into the wider APEC framework. The Uruguay Round will be 
implemented on schedule. Until now, mass unemployment in many OECD 
countries has not materialised in labour standards and other protectionist 
tendencies which could impair Asia's economic performance. Asia's world 
market has increasingly become equivalent with its regional market. Thus, after 
the Uruguay Round there seems more internal than external pressure to go 
regional. But are the benefits worth to bear the risks of distributional conflicts, 
stagnation and even failure? As Asia is at the beginning of regional integration, 
there is little which can be drawn from its empirical evidence. Yet, historical 
experience from more than one hundred integration provides some hints for 
groupings more or less vulnerable to failure. First, smaller groupings including 
bilateral "twinship" agreements such as the Australia-New Zealand type seems 
to have worked best. Agreements with larger numbers of members needed 
leadership role, resource complementarity and growth momentum from 65 
individual member states to be successful. Mega-schemes with double-digit 
membership (all comprising low-income countries) were failures.  
Yet, in all cases (even in Europe) the counterfactual case of relying on 
multilateral trade liberalisation seems to be on par with regionalism if not better. 
Since then, preference erosion has occurred due to ongoing liberalisation at the 
multilateral level and trade barriers becoming porous because of technological 
innovations (trade in invisibles partly substituting for merchandise trade). Such 
erosion has made old EFTA-type of free trade areas economically less 
meaningful than thirty years ago. It is therefore not surprising that computable 
general equilibrium models (while still estimating more favourable results for 
regional integration than partial equilibrium models) suggest for ASEAN that 
gains in total ASEAN trade with the world under unconditional MFN 
liberalisation were more than three times larger than under the AFTA plan 
[deRosa, 1995]. 
The new type of NAFTA and APEC comprises different elements of free trade 
areas, common markets and economic unions and focuses much more on 
liberalising capital flows, freedom of establishment, institutional harmonisation, 
and project-oriented co-operation than on liberalising merchandise trade 
discriminatorily. Therefore, the distinction between regionalism and 
multilateralism has become increasingly diffuse, especially in APEC. Instead of 
block regionalism, open regionalism is now the (braintwisting) label. The label 66 
stands for growth triangles which are basically market-driven, concerted 
acceleration of UR implementation, additional voluntary unilateral liberalisation 
steps, and co-ordination and consultation to harmonise rules and, finally, 
openness to new members inside and outside Asia. Arguing against such 
"minilateralism" brings us to a cost comparison between the Bogor/Osaka way 
and the Geneva way and perhaps to the same critical stance toward the Asian 
way as Helen Hughes raised toward APEC: a "talking shop" [1995: 102] 
pampering regional bureaucracies [Hughes, 1991: 135]. One might be on the 
safe side to conclude: In Asia, the cost-benefit comparison leads us to advocate 
pro regional co-operation and pro multilateral integration. 67 
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Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand  India  Pakistan Sri  Lanka  China, 
P.R. 
Hong Kong  1.000  -0.228 0.303  0.763 -0.685 -0.787 -0.508 -0.670 -0.929 -0.782 -0.604 -0.856 
Korea, Rep. of  -0.228  1.000  0.615 0.323 0.583 0.390 0.643 0.678 0.242 0.511 0.437 0.574 
Singapore 0.303  0.615  1.000  0.394 0.355 0.230 0.503 0.407  -0.087  0.248 0.436 0.120 
Taipei, China  0.763  0.323  0.394  1.000  -0.503 -0.702 -0.332 -0.409 -0.822 -0.599 -0.564 -0.555 
Indonesia -0.685  0.583  0.355  -0.503  1.000  0.928 0.957 0.952 0.835 0.971 0.901 0.926 
Malaysia -0.787  0.390  0.230  -0.702  0.928  1.000  0.821 0.922 0.929 0.961 0.956 0.906 
Philippines  -0.508  0.643 0.503 -0.332 0.957 0.821 1.000  0.881 0.679 0.889 0.815 0.837 
Thailand  -0.670  0.678 0.407 -0.409 0.952 0.922 0.881 1.000  0.802 0.951 0.922 0.924 
India -0.929  0.242  -0.087  -0.822  0.835  0.929  0.679  0.802  1.000  0.907 0.804 0.899 
Pakistan  -0.782  0.511 0.248 -0.599 0.971 0.961 0.889 0.951 0.907 1.000  0.910 0.955 
Sri  Lanka  -0.604  0.437 0.436 -0.564 0.901 0.956 0.815 0.922 0.804 0.910 1.000  0.799 
China,  P.  R. -0.856  0.574 0.120 -0.555 0.926 0.906 0.837 0.924 0.899 0.955 0.799 1.000 
Source: Calculated from ADB, Economic Outlook, 1990 and 1995/96. 
 Table 5 – Ad Valorem Rate of Transport Costsa for Philippine Imports from Asian Countries, in Selected Manufacturing Products, 1983 -1991 
SITC Code  SITC Code  1983  1987  1991 
Rev. 2  Rev. 3  Imports from  Imports from  Imports from 






























541.79-19  542.93-19 8.4 1.1 1.4 4.0 2.0 0.5 5.9 8.7 5.5 5.5 3.2 3.9 2.0 5.9  13.6 7.8 1.7 2.8 2.6 5.2 3.0 
562.16-00  562.16-00  8.4    8.9  22.1               21.7   17.9 
583.21-00  575.11-00 8.7 3.7  13.3 4.7      12.5 8.8 3.6 7.7   3.8   8.1 5.7   4.7 4.9 4.2 4.7 7.2 
641.89-29  641.79-09  10.0   8.6 5.1     4.6 9.8 6.8 8.1 9.3 6.0   3.8 9.2  12.1 5.8 7.8  10.7   5.3 
653.41-09  653.16-09 2.7 1.3 1.8 1.6 2.8 2.8   3.9 3.3 2.0 2.4 3.1 2.9 1.0 3.8 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.5  23.1 1.4 
655.29-09  655.29-19 3.0   2.4 1.7 1.8     1.9 0.6 2.4 3.9   1.0   2.9 0.9 2.7 6.1 1.0    14.0 
662.32-01  662.32-02  8.5  44.2  12.0    4.9   6.1  39.7  10.0    10.7  9.3  5.5  41.5  6.8    13.0  
665.20-02 665.23-09 23.2 17.5 19.5 24.3 21.7  0.4 58.4 18.7 28.6 44.9 34.9 22.0   49.0 14.6 15.0 41.3  3.9 50.9 10.5 30.4 
672.51-01  672.09-00  5.6   9.0  4.8    29.4   10.5  5.3  7.2    14.4  12.6    4.3    13.0 
678.36-00  679.49-09 8.1   8.6 8.2  22.3   7.8 6.1   3.5 8.1 3.6 7.9 4.0 9.4 1.1 4.6 9.8 1.2    14.9 
691.14-00  691.19-00 3.9    50.1 6.1 2.2 6.9  45.7 5.7    23.1 8.7 7.2 6.9  15.1 5.7 6.0 3.0 8.5 5.4 3.9 8.1 
711.91-00  711.91-00 2.5  27.8 0.8   8.5    10.0 1.6 9.6 5.7  39.8 0.8  10.0 8.8 2.8  18.1    11.7 4.2   4.1 
741.61-01  741.89-09 5.6   8.5 0.8 0.9  13.4 4.0 2.9   3.6 5.3 7.6   7.9 3.1 6.0 2.9 2.6 3.0 4.3 4.9 
744.28-09  744.89-09 3.5 6.3 8.3 2.4 4.6   2.0 9.3 0.8 5.4   7.3   1.9 5.7 9.6 2.2 0.8 4.2   3.9 
749.31-00  748.10-00 3.6  29.5 3.4 6.7 3.2   4.9 3.0   2.1   3.5   2.4 2.2   3.8 2.9 5.2    14.7 
773.18-00  773.14-19 3.8 4.3 2.5 6.6 2.3 3.4 6.9  12.2   2.1 4.2 3.1 7.0  13.9 3.3   2.6 8.0 4.8 4.4  30.9 
784.98-00  784.39-19 7.1  50.0 9.5 4.0  25.0 2.8 7.1 6.1   9.3 9.0 9.2  35.9 7.3  10.0 6.7 6.5 5.9 4.6 5.1 4.7 
847.19-20  846.99-01 5.2   6.1 5.1       2.8   2.4 5.0 4.8     3.0   2.4 1.6 1.6  11.9   
872.02-09  872.29-09 5.0 4.3 5.2  10.2 3.8   9.7 5.8 1.2 2.1 3.7 3.7  17.0 6.0 4.4 4.6 2.6 4.3 2.8 3.5 5.7 
874.89-00  874.78-02 3.0 2.1 3.1   2.4  10.0 4.8 2.8 2.3 5.7 4.1 3.0  16.3 1.9 1.5   0.7 3.7 0.7   2.6 
unweighted  average  6.5  16.0 9.2 6.2 8.4 5.0  14.3 6.5 9.4 7.9 9.9 5.8  10.7 9.4 6.3  10.1 5.7 5.1 7.4 8.1  10.4 
a[M Cif/M fob)-1]*100 
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philippines, National Statistics Office, Manila, various issues. 72 
Table 9    –  Asian Countries' Tariff Reductionsa and Binding on Industrial Products under the Uruguay Round 
  Trade-weighted tariff averages  Share of percentage bound 
       Pre-UR  Post-UR 
 Pre-UR  Post-UR  Rate  of 
reduction 
Share of lines  Share of 
imports 
Share of lines  Share of 
imports 
Hong  Kong  0 0 0 1 1  24  23 
Korea, Rep. of  18.0  8.3  53.9  10  24  90  89 
Singapore 12.4  5.1  58.9  0  0  65  73 
Indonesia 20.4  36.9  0b  10 30 93 92 
Malaysia 10.2  9.1  10.8  0  2  62  79 
Philippines 23.9  22.2  7.1  6  9  59  67 
Thailand  37.3  28.0  33.2  2 12 68 70 
India  71.4  32.4  54.6  4 12 62 68 
Sri  Lanka  28.6  28.1  1.7 4 7 8  11 
Japan  3.9 1.7  56.4 n.a.  89 n.a.  96 
Australia  20.1  12.2  39.3 n.a.  36 n.a.  96 
New  Zealand  23.9  11.3  52.7 n.a.  58 n.a. 100 
MEMO:         
Developed  countries  6.3 3.8  39.7 n.a.  94 n.a.  99 
         
aWeighted average of tariff rates on bound lines and applied tariff rates on unbound lines. – bDue to the significance of ceiling bindings in post-
UR tariff averages, no reduction is reported. 
Source: GATT [1994b: 69-78]; Hoda [1994: Table 2]. Table 1 – Sectoral Composition of Intra- and Extra Asian Exports by Asian Sub-Regions, 1970-1993 (in per cent)  
Product categories 
(SITV, Rev.3) 
 0 + 1   2 + 4   4   3   5   7   78  6 + 8   65   67   68   84  5+6+7+8-
67-68 
   
Intra-Asia 
Developing  1970  21.1 26.3  1.6 12.3  4.6  8.9 0.0  25.5  10.8 2.7 1.0 1.1  35.3 
Other  Asia  1980  15.6 16.8  3.0 18.2  5.1 15.1 0.8  27.6  10.6 2.4 1.3 1.7  44.1 
  1982  9.6  10.9 2.3  30.2 4.9  17.1 0.0  25.2 7.8 3.0 1.6 0.9  42.6 
  1990  7.0 6.0 1.1 9.5 7.8  29.8 0.4  39.1  13.3 2.2 1.7 4.3  72.8 
  1993  5.7 4.6 0.9 7.4 8.4  34.8 1.8  37.8  11.9 3.1 1.6 3.7  76.3 
                 
Developing  1970  24.8 23.3  1.3 11.3  4.6  7.5 0.0  27.6  11.8 2.3 0.8 1.8  36.5 
Other  Asia  +   1980  18.4  16.5 2.6  15.7 5.0  14.0 0.6  29.0  11.5 2.2 1.2 2.3  44.5 
China  1982  12.3  10.6 1.8  25.3 5.1  15.5 0.0  29.5 9.9 3.0 1.4 2.4  45.7 
  1990  7.4 5.6 0.9 8.6 7.3  29.0 0.3  41.4  13.2 2.2 1.6 6.2  74.0 
  1993  6.3 4.5 0.8 7.1 8.0  32.7 1.6  40.2  12.1 2.9 1.5 5.4  76.5 
                 
Developing  1970  13.8  20.1 0.5 6.7 7.1  18.2 1.1  33.3  10.5 7.9 2.1 1.6  48.6 
Other  Asia  +   1980  10.3  11.7 1.1  21.4 5.9  20.9 1.3  28.4 7.3 7.1 1.6 1.9  46.5 
China+Japan  1982  8.4 8.5 0.8  25.9 5.6  21.6 1.0  28.6 6.7 6.8 1.5 2.2  47.4 
  1990  7.0 5.0 0.5  10.1 7.1  32.9 1.0  36.2 8.8 4.0 1.2 5.5  71.0 
  1993  6.4 3.7 0.5 6.7 7.2  37.4 2.1  36.5 8.2 4.2 1.0 5.7  75.9 
                 
Developing  1970  15.1  21.7 0.4 7.0 6.4  16.8 1.3  31.7 9.6 7.4 2.5 1.4  45.1 
Other  Asia  +   1980  11.8  12.6 1.0  20.5 5.5  20.4 1.6  27.9 6.9 6.7 1.8 1.8  45.3 
China+Japan+  1982  9.8 9.8 0.7  24.8 5.1  21.3 1.5  27.7 6.1 6.3 1.7 2.1  46.1 
ANZ  1990  8.2 4.8 0.5 9.9 7.0  33.7 1.5  36.1 8.7 3.9 1.2 5.4  71.6 
  1993  7.2 3.6 0.5 6.6 7.1  37.9 2.5  36.5 8.1 4.1 1.0 5.7  76.4 
                 
                to  be  continued... ...Table 1 continued 
Product categories 
(SITV, Rev. 3) 
 0 + 1   2 + 4   4   3   5   7   78  6 + 8   65   67   68   84  5+6+7+8-
67-68 
   
Extra-Asia 
Developing  1970  17.0  27.9 2.3 5.7 1.2 5.5 0.0  42.0 9.7 1.4 3.8  10.5  43.6 
Other Asiaa  1980  10.8 11.9  1.5 21.2  1.9 12.1  0.2 40.0  6.4  1.5  2.4 11.4 50.1 
  1982  10.1 8.3 1.4  21.0 1.5  16.2 0.0  40.5 5.7 1.8 1.4  12.5  55.0 
  1990  7.8 5.1 0.7 7.5 2.8  28.0 1.9  47.4 5.5 1.5 0.6  15.0  76.1 
  1993  7.0 3.9 0.7 4.4 2.6  32.1 1.3  48.4 5.4 1.1 0.5  15.1  81.6 
                 
Developing  1970  17.6  27.6 2.1 4.5 1.6 5.2 0.0  42.6  10.1 1.8 3.8  10.2  43.8 
Other  Asia  +    1980  11.3 11.6  1.3 21.6  2.3 11.1  0.2 40.2  6.8  1.5  2.3 11.6 49.8 
China  1982  10.2 8.4 1.2  23.2 1.8  14.6 0.0  40.9 6.0 4.1 1.4  12.5  51.8 
  1990  8.4 5.3 0.7 8.0 3.1  26.3 1.7  47.2 5.9 1.6 0.6  15.2  74.5 
  1993  7.3 3.9 0.6 4.5 2.9  30.1 1.2  50.0 5.6 1.0 0.5  16.0  81.4 
                 
Developing  1970  9.2 9.8 1.0 1.1 3.2  27.7 5.2  48.2 9.3 9.3 2.1 6.8  67.7 
Other  Asia  +   1980  6.6 5.5 0.9 5.3 2.5  38.5 9.9  39.9 5.7 5.2 1.9 7.9  73.9 
China+Japan  1982  5.3 3.6 0.7 6.1 2.3  43.5 9.9  38.3 4.9 7.3 0.9 7.7  75.8 
  1990  3.7 2.4 0.5 1.6 3.3  50.4  10.4  36.4 4.3 1.7 0.2 9.5  88.2 
  1993  3.3 1.9 0.4 1.0 3.2  50.6 8.6  38.1 4.1 1.1 0.2  10.2  90.6 
                 
Developing  1970  14.2  12.7 0.9 0.9 3.3  24.8 4.5  43.4 7.6 8.3 2.7 6.1  60.6 
Other  Asia  +   1980  9.2 7.4 0.8 4.7 2.4  36.1 9.2  37.9 5.0 4.9 2.2 7.5  69.3 
China+Japan+  1982  7.8 5.5 0.7 5.8 2.2  41.0 9.3  36.6 4.4 7.0 1.3 7.4  71.6 
ANZ  1990  5.2 2.4 0.5 1.4 3.3  50.4  10.3  36.5 4.2 1.7 0.2 9.7  88.3 
  1993  4.4 2.0 0.4 0.9 3.2  50.6 8.4  38.2 4.1 1.0 0.2  10.4  90.7 
                 
aDeveloping other Asia comprises East and Southeast Asian countries and South Asian countries. Taipei, China is not included. 
Source: UN, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, various issues. Own calculations.  
Table 3 – Sectoral Composition of Trade of Taipei, China with Asia and Rest of World (ROW), 1970, 1982, 1993 (in per cent) 


















0+1  10.5 3.2 0.0  43.3 5.8 n.a. 77.1 10.3  n.a.  5.3 16.2 n.a.  4.4  26.8  13.9 
2+4 3.2 3.9 0.2  17.4 0.7 n.a. 9.4 1.9  n.a. 5.4 2.2 n.a.  6.8  9.3 1.0 
3  0.4  40.3 3.7 1.3 0.0 n.a. 2.2 3.4  n.a. 8.5 1.7  n.a.  1.0 1.5  0.1 
5  3.6  31.4 6.5 1.4 0.7 n.a. 0.5 4.1  n.a. 6.7 5.2  n.a. 12.5 3.3  1.9 
6+8 68.6 60.2 75.7 28.4 89.8  n.a. 10.2 60.1  n.a. 45.4 60.8 n.a.  51.1  47.7  63.2 
67  7.4 0.6  34.8 0.8 1.8 n.a. 5.9  21.6  n.a. 16.8 10.1  n.a.  5.9  6.8  1.6 
68  2.2 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.1 n.a. 0.1 4.2  n.a. 0.4 1.3  n.a.  1.1 1.2  0.3 
7 13.6 1.4  13.9 8.0 0.0 n.a. 0.6  20.1  n.a. 26.2 13.9  n.a. 24.2  11.1  20.0 
Imports 1970 
0+1 1.2 0.2 2.6 2.1  36.9 n.a.  22.0 2.6  n.a. 4.1 8.2 n.a.  92.5  8.8 9.4 
2+4 31.9 41.0 95.5  6.6 41.7  n.a. 15.9 83.9  n.a. 84.4 68.2 n.a.  6.0  15.9  25.1 
3  0.2 0.1 1.7 0.5 2.3 n.a. 0.0 4.7  n.a. 0.1 0.2  n.a.  0.0 0.7  15.4 
5  3.6 0.0 0.0  11.0 2.4 n.a. 1.6 0.7  n.a. 3.2 1.0  n.a.  0.2 8.8  11.1 
6+8  45.7 0.0 0.3  33.8  13.5 n.a.  14.3 5.8  n.a. 5.5 2.5 n.a.  0.3  28.6 8.3 
67  1.2 0.0 0.0  14.0 6.6 n.a.  11.9 0.0  n.a. 4.7 0.0  n.a.  0.0  11.4  0.9 
68  1.4 0.0 0.0 2.3 5.1 n.a. 0.0 5.6  n.a. 0.0 0.1  n.a.  0.0 2.3  1.6 
7 17.0 0.0 0.0  45.7 3.3 n.a.  46.1 2.3  n.a.  2.7 19.8  n.a.  1.1 36.7  30.8 
Exports 1982 
0+1 3.4 0.1 7.9  30.7 3.6  2.9  20.4 5.3  0.9 2.5 9.6  31.6  2.1  13.5  3.7 
2+4 2.4 5.8 1.4 3.8 0.2  0.0 2.5 6.0  0.1 0.2 4.7 0.4  0.4 2.6  0.3 
3  0.5 0.0 1.2 1.0 0.0  0.0 3.0 0.5  3.8 3.8 0.3 0.0  2.8 0.8  2.4 
5  6.2  10.1  16.6 6.1 6.7  9.3 6.3 8.3  8.0  11.1 7.0 2.7 13.3 7.4  3.5 
6+8 59.4 54.0 28.5 41.0 62.3  58.8 38.0 27.1  69.0 43.8 40.7 50.5  32.5 47.9  58.9 
67  4.7  20.5 8.3 3.7 4.5  4.7  16.3  26.3  2.5  16.5 6.5 4.9 21.3 6.7  3.2 
68  1.4 1.9 1.2 1.0 0.8  0.7 3.0 2.9  0.3 2.2 2.6 0.5  2.2 1.4  0.7 
7  22.1  7.6 34.8 17.0 21.9  23.5 10.4 23.6  15.6 19.9 28.7  9.6  25.3 21.1  26.6 
Imports 1982 
0+1 3.0  21.3 3.7 2.0  27.8 45.5 8.0 0.1  0.0  19.6 2.2 11.0  67.5  8.3  6.6 
2+4 24.2 30.3 15.2  0.8 14.6  8.3 18.2  1.2  11.7 26.8  5.4 77.2  17.5  5.8  4.1 
3  0.0 0.0  27.6 0.7  27.1  0.0 0.9  17.6  0.0 0.2  23.1 0.0  0.0 7.4  36.5 
5  3.5 14.1  1.6 12.2  4.6  2.0 11.1  0.2  0.0 1.8 8.3 0.8  0.4 9.0  11.5 
6+8 30.8 23.5 51.8 20.1 15.8  42.7 14.9 74.3  88.3 26.5 24.3 10.8  13.7 24.5  14.2 
67  6.2 0.0 0.0  12.3 3.2  0.1  27.5 0.0  0.0 0.3 0.6 0.0  0.1 9.1  2.0 
68  4.4 0.0 0.0 3.0 5.7  0.3 3.0 1.6  0.0 0.4 3.1 0.0  0.1 3.2  1.9 
7  27.8 10.9  0.1 48.8  1.3  1.1 16.4  5.0  0.0 24.5 32.9  0.2  0.8 32.7  23.2 
to be continued ...  
... Table 3 continued 


















0+1 0.8 1.0 0.7  26.5 1.5  0.2 0.8 1.8  0.3 1.0 1.9 0.7  3.1 6.6  0.9 
2+4 0.2 0.2 0.5 2.5 0.2  0.3 1.3 0.2  0.1 0.6 0.5 0.0  0.3 0.8  0.1 
3  0.2 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.4  0.0 2.4 0.4  0.0 1.1 1.2 0.0  0.3 0.4  1.0 
5  13.1 11.4 15.8  7.1 10.3  13.3  9.0 13.4 25.3  11.1 6.5 5.0 13.2  11.1  5.4 
6+8 44.4 39.7 43.6 33.5 34.9  34.2 38.0 24.6  37.7 53.0 22.8 83.1  27.0 38.3  37.1 
67  1.5 0.7 1.7 1.8 5.0  3.7 0.7 2.1  0.9 1.8 1.9 0.7  2.3 1.9  4.0 
68  2.3 3.0 1.2 2.6 1.2  3.2 3.3 2.9  0.4 1.7 3.8 0.6  2.6 2.4  0.9 
7  37.5 43.8 36.0 25.7 46.6  45.1 44.6 54.7  35.4 29.7 61.5  9.9  51.2 38.6  50.6 
Imports 1993 
0+1 2.1  13.1 3.6 0.7  15.1 54.6 1.1 0.7  1.4 7.6 2.6 55.8  16.7  4.0  5.5 
2+4 2.0  13.2 1.7 1.3 9.5  3.7 2.4 4.1  0.8 4.1 0.9 6.0  5.8 2.7  2.8 
3  0.1 4.1  47.0 1.1  24.3  0.0 1.7 3.8  0.0 1.5  13.9 0.0  0.0 6.2  8.7 
5  3.6 22.4  6.5 12.8  3.3  4.7 17.6  3.5  0.0 5.1 8.7 5.8  7.2  10.5  14.4 
6+8 38.5 39.2 37.4 23.5 26.6  33.1 32.6 47.0  97.6 11.8 11.4 32.2  47.9 27.4  29.9 
67  0.2 1.2 0.4 1.6 0.4  0.1 1.9 0.7  0.0 0.4 0.3 0.0  2.6 1.2  0.6 
68  1.1 2.5 1.2 2.5  17.2  2.6 3.8 2.0  0.2  13.9 0.7 0.1  0.9 4.0  3.5 
7 52.4 4.3 2.1  56.4 3.5  1.1  38.9  38.2  0.1 55.5 61.6  0.1  19.0 44.1  34.6 
Source:Commodity Trade Statistics of the Republic of China 1954-1974, Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission Executive 
Yuan, August 1976.– The Trade of China (Taiwan District), compiled and published by the Statistical Department, Inspectorate 
General of Customs, Taipei, Taiwan, May 1983.– Monthly Statistics of Imports, The Republic of China (Taiwan District), 
Statistical Department Directorate General of Customs, Ministry of Finance, December 1993.– Monthly Statistics of Exports, The 
Republic of China (Taiwan District), Statistical Department Directorate General of Customs, Ministry of Finance, December 
1993. 
  
Table 2  –   Sectoral Structure of Selected Asian Countries' Exports and Imports to (from) Asiaa and Rest of World 
(ROW), 1989 and 1993 
 Exports   Imports 
  Asia ROW  Asia/ROW    Asia ROW  Asia/ROW 
SITC, Rev. 3  (per cent of total trade)b        (per cent of total trade)b    
  1989 1992 1989 1992 1989 1992    1989 1992 1989 1992 1989 1992 
INDIA                  
0+1  13.0  20.9  16.1  14.2 0.8 1.5    2.3 1.5 2.9 3.6 0.8 0.4 
3  0.2 0.4 3.2 3.5 0.1 0.1    2.9 9.7  22.5  32.7 0.1 0.3 
2+4  21.4  13.4 6.4 3.5 3.3 3.8    15.3  14.1 9.0 8.2 1.7 1.7 
5  5.1 6.5 7.8 6.8 0.7 1.0    11.2  15.1  14.9  14.0 0.8 1.1 
7  4.8 6.0 8.0 7.3 0.6 0.8    36.0  29.9  16.3  11.6 2.2 2.6 
    78  0.4 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.6    0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.5 4.0 
6+8  54.9 52.3 56.7 62.8  1.0  0.8    26.6 22.5 29.3 22.7  0.9  1.0 
    67  2.9 4.4 1.2 1.7 2.4 2.6    9.8 6.2 5.6 2.9 1.7 2.2 
    68  1.0 3.2 0.4 0.4 2.2 7.6    2.7 2.0 3.7 1.8 0.7 1.1 
5+6+7+8-(67+68)  60.9 57.3 70.8 74.7  0.9  0.8    61.4 59.2 51.1 43.7  1.2  1.4 
               
  Asia ROW  Asia/ROW    Asia ROW  Asia/ROW 
SITC, Rev. 3  (per cent of total trade)b        (per cent of total trade)b    
  1989 1993 1989 1993 1989 1993    1989 1993 1989 1993 1989 1993 
INDONESIA                   
0+1  7.8 8.3  13.2 8.6 0.6 1.0    4.6 3.3 6.6 6.6 0.7 0.5 
3  48.9  41.2  24.3  11.8 2.0 3.5    7.4 6.9 7.8 8.2 1.0 0.8 
2+4  12.3 7.4  18.7  11.5 0.7 0.6    7.9 5.9  13.6  11.3 0.6 0.5 
5  2.4 2.1 2.0 2.4 1.2 0.9    14.9  13.6  19.5  14.8 0.8 0.9 
7  0.8 4.4 1.1 8.0 0.7 0.6    42.9  44.4  34.0  41.8 1.3 1.1 
    78  0.1 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.6    1.9 1.1 0.5 0.3 3.8 3.2 
6+8  26.0 35.6 40.6 57.6  0.6  0.6    22.1 25.9 18.4 17.3  1.2  1.5 
    67  2.1 0.9 1.4 0.5 1.5 2.0    8.1 7.7 4.4 3.8 1.9 2.0 
    68  4.5 1.3 0.7 0.1 6.4  10.2    0.9 1.0 2.7 2.5 0.3 0.4 
5+6+7+8-(67+68)  22.6 40.0 41.7 67.4  0.5  0.6    70.9 75.1 64.9 67.5  1.1  1.1 
               
  Asia ROW  Asia/ROW    Asia ROW  Asia/ROW 
SITC, Rev. 3  (per cent of total trade)b        (per cent of total trade)b    
  1989 1993 1989 1993 1989 1993    1989 1993 1989 1993 1989 1993 
JAPAN                 
0+1  0.9 0.8 0.5 0.4 1.7 1.9    13.1  14.0  15.2  17.2 0.9 0.8 
3  0.8 1.3 0.2 0.2 4.1 5.7    23.6  18.6  19.8  21.3 1.2 0.9 
2+4  1.6 1.3 0.5 0.4 3.2 3.5    15.1  10.1  15.2  12.8 1.0 0.8 
5  9.2 7.7 4.1 4.6 2.2 1.7    3.2 3.0 8.5 9.1 0.4 0.3 
7  56.2 62.3 74.8 76.4  0.8  0.8    7.5 14.0 15.3 18.2  0.5  0.8 
    78  3.1 5.1  18.8  18.5 0.2 0.3    0.0 0.1 2.6 3.1 0.0 0.0 
6+8  29.8 25.0 18.4 16.3  1.6  1.5    36.0 38.9 22.8 19.1  1.6  2.0 
    67  10.8 7.3 3.5 2.4 3.1 3.0    4.0 2.7 1.8 1.2 2.2 2.2 
    68  1.4 1.3 0.5 0.4 2.7 2.9    2.0 0.9 5.6 3.5 0.4 0.2 
5+6+7+8-(67+68)  82.9 86.4 93.4 94.4  0.9  0.9    40.7 52.3 39.2 41.7  1.0  1.3 
              to  be  continued...  
...Table 2 continued 
  Asia ROW  Asia/ROW    Asia ROW  Asia/ROW 
SITC, Rev. 3  (per cent of total trade)b        (per cent of total trade)b    
  1989 1993 1989 1993 1989 1993    1989 1993 1989 1993 1989 1993 
KOREA, REP.                 
0+1  8.0 4.8 1.4 1.0 5.5 4.9    1.9 4.7 7.2 5.3 0.3 0.9 
3  2.5 4.1 0.4 0.9 6.5 4.7    6.3  10.9  15.9  22.5 0.4 0.5 
2+4  3.1 2.5 0.6 0.6 5.4 4.2    7.7 6.7  18.4  13.5 0.4 0.5 
5  5.5 9.1 2.1 3.7 2.6 2.4    11.4  10.5  11.8 9.4 1.0 1.1 
7  26.6 31.5 43.8 54.9  0.6  0.6    46.8 41.5 27.2 29.1  1.7  1.4 
    78  0.2 2.4 5.2 6.7 0.0 0.4    0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 
6+8  54.1 47.3 51.6 38.9  1.0  1.2    25.8 25.7 19.1 19.2  1.4  1.3 
    67  10.2 9.8 3.0 2.7 3.4 3.6    7.3 4.1 3.8 3.1 1.9 1.3 
    68  1.6 0.9 0.4 0.3 4.2 3.0    2.0 1.8 3.6 3.2 0.6 0.6 
5+6+7+8-(67+68)  74.4 77.2 94.2 94.4  0.8  0.8    74.7 71.8 50.6 51.4  1.5  1.4 
               
  Asia ROW  Asia/ROW    Asia ROW  Asia/ROW 
SITC, Rev. 3  (per cent of total trade)b        (per cent of total trade)b    
  1989 1992 1989 1992 1989 1992    1989 1992 1989 1992 1989 1992 
 MALAYSIA                  
0+1  4.8 4.3 4.7 3.3 1.0 1.3    7.5 4.6 8.5 7.2 0.9 0.6 
3  26.9  22.2 3.9 2.2 6.9  10.1    7.3 6.5 2.2 1.4 3.4 4.7 
2+4  29.2  18.5  26.2  15.9 1.1 1.2    2.9 2.1 6.2 3.9 0.5 0.5 
5  2.2 2.8 1.4 1.2 1.6 2.4    7.5 6.8  10.4 9.6 0.7 0.7 
7  24.1 35.9 42.1 53.0  0.6  0.7    49.1 55.8 46.9 53.8  1.0  1.0 
    78  0.1 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1    4.6 2.7 0.7 0.7 6.5 4.1 
6+8  12.6 16.0 21.4 23.9  0.6  0.7    23.6 23.0 19.6 20.4  1.2  1.1 
    67  0.9 1.0 0.4 0.5 2.4 1.9    6.2 4.9 3.6 3.5 1.7 1.4 
    68  2.2 1.1 2.4 1.1 0.9 1.0    1.8 1.7 2.8 2.7 0.6 0.6 
5+6+7+8-(67+68)  35.9 52.6 62.0 76.5  0.6  0.7    72.2 79.0 70.5 77.6  1.0  1.0 
               
  Asia ROW  Asia/ROW    Asia ROW  Asia/ROW 
SITC, Rev. 3  (per cent of total trade)b        (per cent of total trade)b    
  1990 1993 1990 1993 1990 1993    1990 1993 1990 1993 1990 1993 
 PAKISTAN                  
0+1  6.3  10.7 9.8 8.9 0.7 1.2    11.9 4.0  10.3 9.9 1.0 0.4 
3  3.6 3.7 0.5 0.2 6.6  17.6    5.6 0.3  27.0  26.1 1.2 0.0 
2+4  20.4  12.5 7.8 2.6 2.6 4.9    16.7  19.6  11.0 7.5 0.2 2.6 
5  0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.6 0.8    9.8  11.2  19.2  18.7 1.5 0.6 
7  0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3    38.4  52.7  20.3  26.2 0.5 2.0 
    78  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 3.8    8.2  12.3 0.5 0.6 1.9  19.7 
6+8  68.9 72.5 80.9 87.0  0.9  0.8    17.5 12.2 12.0 11.5 16.7  1.1 
    67  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0    4.3 3.4 3.3 3.7 0.7 0.9 
    68  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -  -   1.1 0.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 0.4 
5+6+7+8-(67+68)  69.5 73.0 81.7 88.0  0.9  0.8    60.3 72.1 46.6 51.2  1.3  1.4 
to be continued...  
...Table 2 continued 
  Asia ROW  Asia/ROW    Asia ROW  Asia/ROW 
SITC, Rev. 3  (per cent of total trade)b        (per cent of total trade)b    
  1989 1993 1989 1993 1989 1993    1989 1993 1989 1993 1989 1993 
SINGAPORE                  
0+1  5.1 6.1 4.0 3.0 1.3 2.0    5.4 4.5 5.9 5.9 0.9 0.8 
3  25.4  19.3 7.9 6.4 3.2 3.0    6.9 4.0  20.2  18.6 0.3 0.2 
2+4  6.0 2.0 5.0 2.5 1.2 0.8    6.0 2.7 1.6 1.3 3.8 2.0 
5  10.3 8.9 3.8 4.4 2.7 2.0    4.6 4.0  10.4  10.4 0.4 0.4 
7  35.0 46.5 60.6 68.0  0.6  0.7    50.8 61.6 38.3 41.6  1.3  1.5 
    78  0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1    0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 3.4 2.5 
6+8  17.0 15.5 17.2 14.0  1.0  1.1    25.1 22.1 21.7 20.6  1.2  1.1 
    67  1.4 1.2 0.7 0.5 2.1 2.6    3.9 2.5 2.4 2.3 1.6 1.1 
    68  3.1 1.9 1.1 0.4 2.7 5.4    1.9 1.4 2.2 2.2 0.9 0.6 
5+6+7+8-(67+68)  57.7 67.7 79.8 85.6  0.7  0.8    74.8 83.8 65.7 68.1  1.1  1.2 
               
  Asia ROW  Asia/ROW    Asia ROW  Asia/ROW 
SITC, Rev. 3  (per cent of total trade)b        (per cent of total trade)b    
  1989 1993 1989 1993 1989 1993    1989 1993 1989 1993 1989 1993 
THAILAND                  
0+1  38.4  22.0  31.3  21.6 1.2 1.0    3.1 2.4 7.7 6.7 0.4 0.4 
3  0.0 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.0 1.4    8.8 7.9 9.4 7.0 0.9 1.1 
2+4  14.2 7.2 2.9 2.5 5.0 2.9    5.3 3.4 8.5 7.8 0.6 0.4 
5  3.0 4.5 0.9 1.7 3.3 2.6    9.3 9.1  13.8  11.4 0.7 0.8 
7  18.0 36.6 17.2 24.8  1.0  1.5    45.3 50.4 28.9 39.4  1.6  1.3 
    78  0.0 0.0 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.1    6.8 6.3 1.1 2.8 6.4 2.2 
6+8  25.0 26.3 45.4 47.4  0.6  0.6    26.4 25.0 25.3 23.4  1.0  1.1 
    67  0.7 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.9 2.2    10.0 7.5 6.1 5.9 1.6 1.3 
    68  1.5 0.2 0.3 0.1 5.3 2.7    1.6 1.1 3.4 2.8 0.5 0.4 
5+6+7+8-(67+68)  43.7 66.1 62.5 73.5  0.7  0.9    69.5 76.0 58.4 65.4  1.2  1.2 
aAsian partner countries: China P.R., Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea Rep., Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand. -  bDifference between the sum of shares in one-digit items and 100 are 
due to unrecorded trade in SITC 9. 
Source:  International Trade Centre UNCTAD/GATT: PCTAS: Trade analysis system on personal Computer; 
five year times series of international trade statistics with market share and trend analysis by country and 
product. Own calculations.  
 